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Abstract
Security in Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) is difficult because of its operating
environment and its lack of a central control unit, making classical security measures
inapplicable. MIDAS is a project funded by the European Commission which creates
a "Middleware platform for developing and deploying advanced mobile services".
It is important for MIDAS to find a middle ground where it provides reasonable
security, while using little extra processing power and battery and remains easy to
use. In this thesis we identify the vulnerabilities and security measures needed to
secure MIDAS, while preserving usability. We approach this problem by analysing
the MIDAS design and find similarities to other known systems. From the analysis
we identify threats and ethical issues, and suggest security mechanisms that solve
MIDAS specific problems. The resulting security mechanisms are described in detail
and tied together to create four main configurations with increasing levels of security.
The configurations can then be used by MIDAS developers to implement security
in a consistent way. The results are specific to MIDAS, but issues, requirements
and security building blocks can be used by other projects for applicable MANET
problems.
Keywords: Mobile ad-hoc network (MANET), Ethical issues, Web-of-Trust, Full
distribution, No Central Authority, MIDAS
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The aim of the IST-MIDAS project is to develop an application middleware platform
to “simplify and speed up the task of developing and deploying mobile applications
and services”1. The project is funded by the European Commission. It started January
2006 and will end September 2008.
The project has a pure research agenda which later will lead to a commercial product
based on the results.
The early MIDAS project mandate states that security is out of scope and should be
solved in a parallel or consecutive project. Some work has been done investigating
how to protect the routing protocol and network traffic using encrypted messages.
This will however not suffice when dynamic extension of the network is needed. If
the system is to be accepted and used more work should be done.
The MIDAS middleware aims to give application developers a stable Application
Programming Interface (API) to exchange messages and retrieve information from an
ad-hoc network while making the specifics of the network technology and topology
transparent to the developer.
Since ad-hoc networks usually are wireless, as is the case with MIDAS, eavesdropping
and packet injection is easier than with wired networks. This makes security more
difficult, especially if sensitive information is transmitted. In this report we identify
the most exposed security issues in the MIDAS middleware, look at ethical issues
regarding information available in the network and look at ways to communicate
securely on an ad-hoc basis.
1.2 Problem statement
MIDAS has developed an architecture and middleware platform for solving
some of the technical difficulties when developing mobile applications. Issues
like network topology, low bandwidth, unreliable connections and distributed data
1http://www.ist-midas.org/
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storage are addressed by the middleware. However security needs are not addressed
and no security functionality is provided.
The objective here is to 1) Identify security needs in the MIDAS middleware, 2)
Evaluate possible solutions.
1.3 Research goals
The main goal of this thesis is to identify the security issues in MIDAS and to assess
how the security level can be raised to an appropriate level. It is important to identify
changes that affect the design or architecture as these are hard to implement on a
running system. The earlier these changes are adapted the cheaper they are to fix [23].
We will investigate what vulnerabilities exist in MIDAS, and define a reasonable
border of responsibility between the middleware and applications running on top of
it.
We will achieve these goals by defining security requirements for the system, research
similar systems and solutions, propose a model for how security can be implemented
and identify architectural changes, if any. The model will be validated together with
the MIDAS research group. Which requirements have been met and how, which trade-
offs where made and what new problems emerged will be discussed.
1.3.1 Ethical issues and incentives for security
Ethical issues in this thesis are issues created by the MIDAS software in its interaction
with people. We have devoted the first part of Chapter 4 to ethical issues where
MIDAS specific issues are identified. We will use a general framework to find the
issues and put them in context. The identified issues should be a background and a
motivational factor for security.
The ethical issues should also discuss what makes people share their personal
information. This is a supporting section to the basic ethical issues which emphasises
the responsibility the domain responsible2 has when making a MIDAS service. We
would also like to point out the factors that can make it easier to achieve success with
MIDAS driven services.
The second part of the incentives for security is the security analysis and the threat
model. The security analysis should reveal specific weak points of the MIDAS
architecture. The threat model should give a clear picture of the possible types
of threats to MIDAS applications. Together they will be the basis for the security
requirements.
1.3.2 Security solution
The goals for the security solution part of the thesis is to suggest security mechanisms
that together can solve the security requirements. The solution shall raise the level of
2See Section 3.4 for explanation of domain responsible
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security by applying security mechanisms to specific parts while maintaining a view
of the entire system. The described mechanisms in the security solution can consist of
mechanisms we suggest that are new, or mechanisms from other systems.
1.3.3 Level of security supported by middleware
Achieving military grade security in the MIDAS middleware is in itself not desirable,
because MIDAS is to be used commercially and usability has to be balanced with
the level of security; it needs to be "secure enough". Since MIDAS is a middleware,
platform security might not be an issue for the service itself. "Secure enough" might be
no security at all if all the information generated in the network is considered public.
Applications and protocols can be made secure on top of insecure infrastructure.
Examples include S/MIME [16] for securing email and kerberos [26] for authentication
over unencrypted links. This means that security mechanisms provided by the
middleware for the applications to use do not have to cover all thinkable demands.
If the specific service domain requires stronger security than the middleware can
provide, it has to be achieved in the applications. Making this trade-off is important
for the middleware to be usable. If for instance all traffic was encrypted and only
trusted nodes were allowed to participate in the network the middleware would be
rendered useless for spectators of a sporting event.
1.4 Research method
We have chosen to perform a case study of the MIDAS middleware. The case
study begins with an examination of system documentation to obtain a deeper
understanding of how the middleware works. When the deeper understanding of the
system is in place we use the resulting mental model to generalise about the system
and find similarities with other systems.
Since this is a security analysis we use prior knowledge of security patterns and
vulnerabilities to identify potential weaknesses in MIDAS. These weaknesses in
combination with threats to the system give rise to security requirements, which then
are incorporated into a solution aiming to mitigate risks and mend weaknesses.
The case study evolves through this thesis and its progress is reflected chronologically
through the chapters. The last part of the thesis evaluates and discusses the results of
the case study, and is thus technically not a part of the case study.
1.5 Scope
This thesis investigates and suggests appropriate security measures for MIDAS. We
give a complete solution on how we would incorporate security in the MIDAS
architecture. We will not discuss mathematical strengths of cryptographic algorithms
and not give exact key lengths, protocols or algorithms. Instead we are flexible, leaving
it to the MIDAS developers to select algorithms and such, we suggest one technology,
3
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but show how it can be replaced. We do this in part because of the uncertainty as to
when MIDAS will be in production and how well it will manage performance issues.
Advice on key lengths, algorithms and technologies can easily be found later, and
it is more appropriate to choose these functional third party solutions when security
is introduced, rather than now, because experience shows that as computing power
increases and new attacks surfaces, algorithms and key lengths must be reconsidered.
We do not interfere or question issues that the MIDAS documentation states it will
solve. These issues include: Common notion of time, Database consistency in network
partitions, Database synchronisation, Reliability and Availability, Network setup,
Node addressing and routing. These issues are mentioned in various parts of the thesis
in relation to security, when security measures might influence them.
1.6 Report outline
• Chapter 1 - Introduction
• Chapter 2 - Peer-to-peer networks
• Chapter 3 - The MIDAS middleware
• Chapter 4 - Incentives for security
• Chapter 5 - MIDAS security requirements
• Chapter 6 - Security building blocks
• Chapter 7 - Different configurations
• Chapter 8 - Evaluation and Discussion
• Chapter 9 - Conclusion and Future work
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 represent the state of the art and related work. Section 4.3, Security
analysis of the architecture is the transition from state of the art to own contribution.
Chapter 5 defines the security requirements in the MIDAS middleware based on our
analysis of the architecture, concerns identified by the MIDAS project and our ethical
discussion. Chapter 6 presents our suggestions of security building blocks that can
be used to implement the identified security requirements and Chapter 7 presents
different configurations of these building blocks to achieve different levels of security.
Chapter 8 evaluates our work and discusses the solution with regards to feasibility of
integration, simple performance characteristics, benefits, pitfalls and the value of our
research. The last chapter concludes the thesis and sums up future work that has been
pointed out through the thesis.
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Peer-to-peer networks
This chapter introduces properties of different P2P networks, look at typical security
problems and refer to related work on security.
2.1 Peer-to-peer networks
P2P networks are non-hierarchical and characterised by peers which cooperate to
achieve a common service. Since cooperation is essential, every node has to have some
interest in a working service.
In a P2P network there is usually no notion of servers, the nodes act as both client
and server at the same time. One beneficial property of these networks is that they
can be made to scale linearly with the number of users in the network as each new
participant also contribute to the overall resources in the network. This includes
storage capacity, bandwidth and processing power. Another advantage with P2P
networks is the robustness of random failures. Nodes come in and out of reach all
the time, so the networks are configured to handle these types of situations. Typical
uses are file sharing networks1 (for efficient searching and distribution of content),
anonymising networks2 and media streaming [59].
2.2 MANET
A MANET is a self configuring network of nodes connected by wireless links and a
special form of P2P. In itself it only provides the ability for peers to communicate, so
to be of real value it must have a purpose and provide a service/solve a problem
for the participating nodes. The One Laptop per Child 3 project is an excellent
example of MANETs where the laptops form a network among themselves where no
infrastructure is available.
1Gnutellahttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gnutella
Napster http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napster
2Tor network http://www.torproject.org/
3One laptop per child network cooperation. http://laptop.org/
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As Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and smartphones become more and more
common, MANETs become increasingly popular and their range of applications
increase. MANETs have the advantage of providing network services without an
existing infrastructure, and can be setup on very short notice. This enables mobile
devices to create and join networks at will, supporting services anywhere and anytime
[55].
Because MANETS do not rely on existing infrastructure and has minimal configu-
ration needs it is ideal for emergency situations and military operations. This was
pointed out by Yi and Kravets [60].
2.3 Context-aware pervasive systems
Context aware systems sense their environment and are able to react to changes in
it [46]. In this thesis we use context as a common denominator of personal states.
Context usually includes location, nearby people and resources, but mood, social
setting and availability also apply. Context is dynamic and it changes in line with
the environment.
Context aware computing is a form of pervasive (or ubiquitous) computing [46]. In
pervasive systems, devices are incorporated in everyday objects and interconnection
between them make new applications possible. Humans can interact with these
devices without even knowing that they are there.
Generating new services in context-aware pervasive systems have been heavily
researched in later years. The possibilities for a new area of computer usage are
enormous, but really useful applications have yet to appear. The field needs a
groundbreaking application to reach large scale use.
As we will see later, there are also some privacy issues involved with connected
pervasive systems that need to be handled.
2.4 Storage in P2P networks
A common area of application for P2P networks is data storage and distribution, and
several schemes have seen widespread use. The fault tolerant properties of these
networks ensure both availability and integrity by replicating the data [10].
One widely researched scheme is Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) [42] [50] which
tries to maximise availability while minimising network traffic and node traversing
in searches. DHTs generates a structured topology in the network by arranging nodes
in a ring and distributing keys (and data) along this ring. Smart algorithms ensure that
looking up keys can be done fast and reliable.
Other schemes (as used in MIDAS) have a distributed database where replica nodes
are scattered in the network sharing the load. Depending on how fast the network
topology changes (nodes entering and leaving) the number of replicas has to be
adjusted to balance network traffic with availability.
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2.5 Security in mobile P2P networks
Mobile peer-to-peer networks are characterised by having no central control unit
making classical network security measures inapplicable [44, p. 33] and they use
wireless links which is easy to both eavesdrop and inject packages into [5]. Also,
devices are small and are easily lost or stolen [22]. This implies that ensuring security
for sensitive information in these networks is difficult. The fact that the devices
have limited processing capabilities and battery life means that strong cryptographic
schemes might have to be avoided.
The threats that affect MANETs have been categorised Hubaux et al. [22] as:
• Attacks on basic mechanisms
• Attacks on the security mechanisms.
Basic mechanisms include communication links (wireless), captured and compro-
mised devices, node behavior and routing mechanisms [29]. Threats against stored
data include deletion, data modification, denying data existence and Denial of Service
(DoS) by introducing too much data into the system.
Attacks against the routing protocol in MANETS are described by Sarkar et al. [44, pp.
25-27]:
Rushing attack attacks the node discovery phase of the routing protocol and tries to
become a central hub in the network.
Black hole attack drops packages to disrupt service (often combined with the rushing
attack described above)
Neighbour attack the attack involve failing to update the route hop part of messages
when forwarding packets, making the next node believe it is in direct contact
with the previous node.
Jellyfish attack delays packages instead of dropping them as in the black hole attack
creating unnecessary long message delays.
Security mechanisms are system dependent, but often include cryptographic systems,
access control schemes, signatures and the like.
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Chapter 3
The MIDAS middleware
This chapter explains the MIDAS architecture and its components. Proof of Concept
(PoC) scenarios and key challenges are introduced as well as related security work
done in the project.
3.1 The MIDAS project
The IST-MIDAS project is funded by the European commission and belongs to the
program “Mobile and Wireless System and Platforms beyond 3G”. The project shall
implement a platform that:
Simplify and speed up the task of developing and deploying mobile applications
and services [31].
The MIDAS middleware consists of an overall architecture, and middleware building
blocks providing solutions to technical issues that must be addressed in developing
mobile solutions (e.g. common connectivity issues, data retrieval methods and context
aware optimisations). The middleware is used by application developers that produce
a collection of applications (with instances running on multiple nodes), which together
implement a mobile service1. The mobile service is customised for a particular event
(of limited duration) and is fundamentally based on supporting mobile information
sharing.
3.2 MIDAS proof of concept scenarios
The MIDAS project presents two proof of concept scenarios as an illustration of
its usefulness. The two scenarios are selected to reflect two completely different
1There is some inconsistency within the research community about the terms “service” and
“application”. In the Telecoms community a service is typically something achieved using applications,
but in the Software Engineering community - using the Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) approach
- applications are realized using services. Note that, in MIDAS, we adopt the Telecoms style, basing this
on the terminology dictionary [34] published by the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) [35].
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extremities, which give rise to different sets of requirements and is used to validate the
solution. The scenarios are described in detail in MIDAS Deliverable 1.2 [54, pp. 15-19].
3.2.1 Emergency scenario
The scenario describe a fire on the Paris Metro. The fire is detected by the train driver
which issues the fire emergency procedure from his MIDAS enabled device. Location
and other attributes of interest are automatically sent to the emergency headquarter.
All MIDAS enabled devices nearby receive information about the emergency based
on the context the device is in. Emergency personnel arriving at the scene will be
requested to join the emergency network and after responding to the request the
device will be configured with the necessary applications and start receiving messages.
Because the wireless infrastructure is limited under ground, MIDAS devices quickly
extend the reach of existing network coverage.
Key features in this scenario is:
• More reliable communication in places where infrastructure is non-existent or
knocked out.
• Easy setup and configuration of user nodes.
• Context based addressing makes organizing easier.
• Logging for after the fact evaluation of the emergency.
3.2.2 Sports scenario
The sport event chosen is Tour de France. This event has some unique challenges due
to the divergency and number of users and the location of the event. The location
changes every day and ranges from populated city areas to mountain tops. Cyclists
should be tracked in real time with bio information and geological position and speed.
The cyclists current position in the race combined with overall ranking should also be
combined to see how the race will affect the results.
The users of the system have different requirements based on their role (e.g. VIP, team
manager, journalist, spectator, police officer or other). A spectator will for instance be
interested in being notified 5 minutes in advance of his favourite cyclist passing him.
This notification request will have to take into account the position of the spectator
(approximately) and the position and speed of the cyclist.
Key features in this scenario is:
• Transparent network communication when a large number of users and multiple
networks are present.
• Instant infrastructure setup where none exists.
• Context information and context notification capabilities.
10
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3.3 MIDAS middleware architecture
This section presents the MIDAS architecture. MIDAS follows a modular architecture
where well defined interfaces between the components makes it possible to reimple-
ment each module isolated from the others. Figure 3.1 shows the architecture in a
component interaction diagram. The description is based upon MIDAS Deliverable
2.2 Part 2 [36].
Figure 3.1: MIDAS architectural overview
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The MIDAS middleware is divided into 5 components.
• MIDAS Data Space (MDS) Component
• Communication and routing (CRT) Component
• Context Space (CXS) Component
• Deployment (DPL) Component
• Common Functions (CFG) Component.
3.3.1 MIDAS Data Space
The MIDAS Data Space component is characterized by the following features:
• MDS stores and retrieves data from potentially several nodes
• MDS provides a notification service for applications which alerts them when
data is modified.
• MDS manages the replication and distribution of data.
The MDS consists of a top layer which does Query Analysis, a Data Allocator which
distributes data across an unknown amount of nodes each containing a local database,
and service components which enable queries, mask the distribution for the developer
and synchronise data. To aid synchronisation and the provided consistency, deletion
of data is not supported. Instead the status flag in the metadata is updated to reflect
the delete operation.
3.3.2 Communication and routing
The Communication and Routing component is characterized by the following fea-
tures:
• CRT makes the transport medium transparent for the application developer.
• CRT will store transmitted messages for nodes not available in the network for
the time specified in the time to live (TTL).
• CRT will use a distributed routing table scheme to route packages.
• Context based routing (CBR) will use both CXS functionality and CRT function-
ality to route context addressed packages. It is defined as a part of the CRT
component.
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The CRT component consists of a Message Dispatcher, Packet Forwarder, Network
Manager, Context Based Router, Node Identifier Solver and CRT Manager. From a
security standpoint the most interesting subcomponents are the Packet Forwarder
which determine the best network medium to use and The Node Identifier Solver
which accesses routing tables and requests updates from Central Node if information
is unavailable. The other components perform tasks like storing messages and
interfacing with network interfaces.
3.3.3 Context Space
The CXS Component is characterized by the following features:
• Context knowledge base (CKB) stores context information and contains the static
domain model and dynamic context data. This component provides reasoning.
The model and context data are stored in MDS.
• Context engine (CTX) provides context triggers and context queries which
aggregate and derive new knowledge.
• CAM is the facade which uses CKB and CTX to provide the Context Addressable
Messaging service.
The CXS component has the three sub components CKB, CTX and CAM. Security
issues with CTX includes privacy and integrity of context information. Addresses
generated by CAM are based on context information distributed to all nodes by
the routing protocol. This results in a trade-off between addressing and revealing
information.
3.3.4 Deployment Module
The Deployment Module Component is responsible for distribution, configuration
and installation of applications either with user interaction or when context conditions
are met.
The context conditions enable DPL to install predefined packages seamlessly when a
user enters a new context.
• DPL will use MDS to store software bundles.
• DPL will register triggers in CTX for context dependencies.
• DPL will download, install and manage all MIDAS applications.
3.3.5 Common Functions
CFG is the component containing all the functionality which doesn’t fit into the other
components. CFG is intended to have functions that manage time, battery and power,
error handling, local logging and identify storage resources on the device.
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Common notion of time related to the lack of a global clock poses a possible security
issue in MIDAS, but according to requirements from Deliverable 1.2 Part IV [52], a
solution of relative time between nodes is being discussed. We are aware of the
problem of global time, though in this thesis we will disregard it, since no solution
for time management is decided upon at the time of writing.
3.4 Service domains
Services implemented on the MIDAS middleware are always defined for a given
service domain. The sports and emergency scenarios from Section 3.2 are examples of
different service domains with very different needs.
For each service domain there exists a domain ontology describing entities in the
system and how they interact. All services within the same network share this
common ontology.
Specification of a domain ontology model are initiated by the domain responsible which
is usually an organisation who want to develop mobile services within its domain.
Great care should be taken when specifying such a model since it will be shared by all
services running in the network.
3.5 Types and roles of nodes in MIDAS
The MIDAS network are built up of different types of nodes, which again can be
assigned roles. The different types are described in MIDAS Deliverable 1.2 Part I [54,
pp. 35-38]. The node types and roles interesting to our evaluation are described here.
MIDAS node is the definition of a node with the core MIDAS components installed,
making it able to take part in the network. A user node is the most common type of
MIDAS node, which has different applications installed based on the given service
domain and current context. One or more central node(s) are required in all MIDAS
networks (or partitions) to keep track of which other MIDAS nodes are present. If
no central node are present this role will be assigned by the CRT component. The
deployment administrator node supply user nodes with packages (configuration settings
and software applications) when users request to take part in a service.
3.6 Key challenges in MIDAS
MIDAS solves the problem of network addressing complexity in MANETs and at the
same time support given service domains with ontology rules for reasoning and a
global shared data store for information sharing. Key challenges according to the
projects own definition are [31]:
• Large number of users
• Network must be setup on short notice in ad-hoc fashion
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• Pre-existing infrastructure limited
• Dynamic network topology
3.7 Proposed security approaches in MIDAS
Some work has been done previously with assessing the security needs in MIDAS.
Our solution is based upon this work, trying to eliminate some of the limitations
found. The proposed solution is intended for emergency scenario, but might work
in the sports scenario as well.
3.7.1 Proposed security approach for sport event scenario
We do not know of any previously proposed security approaches for sport event
services on top of the MIDAS middleware. Our proposed solution also cover this
scenario.
3.7.2 Proposed security approach for emergency scenario
Puzar et al. proposes a security solution for an emergency service [38] running on
top of MIDAS. They combine a bottom-up and top-down approach to secure network
traffic including the routing protocol, and ensure application security by message
signing.
Puzar makes the following assumptions:
• Members of the rescue personnel (users) can be trusted.
• Devices are preconfigured before coming to the scene; this includes installation
of the necessary software, certificates, etc.
• Users carry tokens with personal certificates containing their credentials (name,
rank / role within the organisation, etc.) and use them to authenticate themselves
towards the service.
• The user-to-device authentication process is assumed to be secure enough
• Software developed on top of the MIDAS middleware is considered clean (that
is, it is not vulnerable, there are no viruses, trojans, etc.)
Given these assumptions Puzar et al. propose a solution which is reasonably
secure. Their solution uses X.509 certificates that are signed and installed prior to
the emergency situation. These certificates are also used to prove rank / roles within
organisation and can be validated by all nodes considered a part of the network
(certificates are ultimately signed by the same Certificate authority (CA)). Puzar
utilizes this to establish a symmetric group key using the SKiMPy key protocol [37].
This key is used to encrypt traffic in the network and nodes with this key make up
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a core network that routes packages. Untrusted nodes are excluded, but temporary
certificates can be issued to nodes manually. This will make the node a passive member
of the core routing network, able to participate but not able to change the routing tables
or act as a storage node. Messages are also signed or encrypted using the private or
public key of the X.509 certificates to provide application security.
The assumptions of pre-installed certificates and trusted users will not hold in all
situations where MIDAS could be used, as the design is limiting. Spectators in the
sports scenario will not have a trusted certificate and will therefore not be able to take
part in the core routing network loosing the benefits of a MANET. The hierarchical
trust model (X.509 can only have one root-certificate) will also be a problem where
several organisations cooperate to generate services in the network. In Section 6.1 we
will look at how some of these limitations can be removed by simple changes to the
design and what the consequences of these changes are.
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Incentives for security
There are several incentives for security in the MIDAS network:
• Sensitive information can be available and must be handled in an ethically secure
way.
• Laws and regulations demand that personal information is kept private.
• Software that make users confident that it is secure is more likely to be accepted
and reach widespread usage (which is a definite goal in MIDAS)
• The systems normal operation and behavior is dependent upon the system state
which should be protected from malicious modification.
The first three incentives will be discussed in the first part of this chapter. Ethical issues
that arise in human computer interaction are also discussed to determine what people
find acceptable or not. This is a broad topic with several different viewpoints, but we
limit our discussion to issues closely related to how MIDAS gather information and
how this affects people. Acceptance of the application relies on this.
The second part will make a analysis of the architecture to identify weaknesses in
the system, and define a threat model that describes possible attackers in the MIDAS
network. The goal here is to find what effects the normal operation of the system.
This chapter will be the basis for the security requirements in the next chapter.
4.1 Ethical issues in pervasive systems
What identifies ethical issues is a concern about how computers affect humans. The
field of context aware and pervasive systems is relatively new. Ever since the first types
of systems, designers noticed the new kind of ethical issues resulting from new system
behaviour, namely the localisation factor. Roy Want describes the press attention
stirred when introducing a call routing system in the early 90‘s in his article [57].
The system used badges which identified persons and coupled it with their location
to route incoming calls to the nearest telephone. He found that the interpretation of
right-to-privacy is strongly connected with the social setting in which the new system
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is being used. People accepted the system because it helped them in their work. Khalil
and Connely show further in their study [25] of cell phone context information1 that
this interpretation is connected with where we are and who is seeking us. They found
that people are likely to reveal information when it will be beneficial to themselves.
New systems therefore need to provide a useful service to be accepted among the
general public.
The two articles cited above highlight common issues in pervasive systems, namely
privacy and information disclosure. These issues are regulated by two factors; legal
requirements and public opinion. Milne [33] highlights the connection between the
marketer 2 and consumer3 interaction and lists some of the influences that they have.
Figure 4.1 shows the influences and interactions between marketer and consumer as
they fit into the framework proposed by Milne.
2 Overview of the Special Issue
Indeed, the digitalization of new aspects of marketer and
consumer information exchanges will present additional pri-
vacy challenges.
Privacy policy is an issue that is being decided as tech-
nology emerges and new markets develop. Marketing
researchers can contribute to privacy public policy discus-
sion by examining the nature of information exchange
between marketers and consumers. This special issue,
Privacy and Ethics Issues in Database/Interactive
Marketing and Public Policy, features six articles that
address various aspects of marketer–consumer information
interaction and antecedent conditions affecting marketer
information strategy and consumer information behavior.
In this introductory article, I present a privacy research
framework that highlights four key dimensions of the informa-
tion interaction between marketers and consumers. Within this
framework, I discuss the contributions of the six articles in this
special issue and raise possible directions for further research.
Privacy Research Framework
Consumer privacy has been defined as “the consumer’s abil-
ity to control (a) presence of other people in the environ-
ment during a market transaction or consumption behavior
and (b) dissemination of information related to or provi ed
during such transactions or behaviors to those who were not
present” (Goodwin 1991, p. 152). The definition explains
the realm of consumer privacy in terms of consumers’ con-
trol over their personal information and the environment in
which the transaction takes place. The environment dimen-
sion has been criticized (Foxman and Kilcoyne 1993),
because such situational factors are individual specific and
the desire to be left alone is not absolute. Still, the concept
of control introduced by Westin (1967) and incorporated by
Goodwin (1991) has been used in other definitions of pri-
vacy realms (e.g., Culnan 1995; Foxman and Kilcoyne
1993; Nowak and Phelps 1995). Subsequently, consumer
knowledge has been incorporated as a second dimension
(Culnan 1995; Foxman and Kilcoyne 1993; Nowak and
Phelps 1995). Taken together, the consumer privacy states
may be conceptualized in terms of consumer knowledge
(high/low) and control (high/low) dimensions.
Consumer privacy is potentially compromised during
information exchanges with marketers. Information
exchanges can occur in a myriad of ways: In some ways con-
sumers volunteer the information, and in others it is gathered
without consumers’ knowledge and consent. For consumers
to have control, they need to have a say in the type of infor-
mation that is proper for organizations to collect and use as
a result of information exchanges. Indeed, both self-
regulation efforts and legislation proposals focus on whether
organizations have provided consumers with the knowledge
and opportunity to control the type of information the orga-
nizations collect, use, and transfer to third parties.
The premise of the research framework employed in this
article is that giving consumers more knowledge and control
over information exchanges can best protect consumer pri-
vacy. The research framework shown in Figure 1 depicts
four types of marketer–consumer information interactions
that have a bearing on consumer information privacy. The
interaction is the interplay between a marketer’s information
strategy and a consumer’s information behavior. The four
types of interactions include
1. Information requests and disclosures statements: made by
marketers;
2. Information provision and marketing contact: volunteered
information exchange by consumers with subsequent contact
by marketers;
3. Information capturing without consent: observed information
gathered by marketers that is not volunteered by consumers; and
4. Information practices: uses of information by both marketers
and consumers.
Consumer privacy is enhanced when consumers are
aware of information practices and are given a choice over
information provision and use. In contrast, consumer pri-
vacy is decreased when there is unwanted marketing contact
or information gathering without consent. Finally, various
information practices of both marketers and consumers can
Figure 1. Privacy Research Framework
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Figure 4.1: Milnes ethical issues framework 4.
For pervasive systems and MANETs in particular, influences that affect how privacy
is perceived and handled are: Government regulation, Company policy and ethics,
Technology, Perceptions and Situational factors. MIDAS must take this into account
when designing a solution that will handle personal information.
4.1.1 Localisation
As MIDAS uses wireless devices, localisation of a user is possible. Physical position is
considered private and disclosure of this information becomes an issue in MIDAS.
Localisation of users in MIDAS is threatened because of at least two factors: Signal
detection and route tracing. Signal detection is a problem that is hard to protect
against. The problem arises because the small differences of Radio Frequency (RF)
waves in a radio transmitter can be used to identify the device much like a fingerprint
[57]. Remley et al. have tried to use this fingerprint for device authentication and
1Cell phone context information in this case was where a people were and what they were doing
2Marketer is the person or company that provides a service and has ownership over the computer
system. The MIDAS equivalent is the domain responsible.
3Consumer is the person which uses a service and contribute information to the system. The MIDAS
equivalent is a user.
4Figure copied from Milne [33]
18
4.1. ETHICAL ISSUES IN PERVASIVE SYSTEMS
their test shows that in a controlled environment it is possible to positively identify a
transmitter [41]. Protection against this threat will be nearly impossible to implement
in MIDAS since we cannot control the RF transmitter at this level. However, the
information can only be used to fingerprint a device and locate it when its signal is
within reach of an attackers antenna and a connection between a user and the device
cannot be made solely with this information.
Route tracing is an attack on the network protocol which can be used to see how data
from one node travels through the network. By analysis of the routing table and the
network traffic one node transmits, it is possible to locate the node. The routing table
tells which nodes are nearby and how many intermediate nodes messages go through.
For MIDAS this means that specific node identifiers can be located by analysis of the
network protocol and transmission of network packets.
4.1.2 Personal and sensitive information
Personal information, whether it is medical history, social security numbers or
other secrets is private and should be protected from unauthorized access. For the
emergency scenario this kind of information will be useful for rescue personnel, but
must be handled with care. In MIDAS there will be a domain responsible which has
to decide what information should be possible to collect in the system and how this
information should be treated. This will be defined in the ontology model5.
Using the two scenarios presented in Section 3.2 as a basis, sensitive information
can range from medical history to strategic sport information. What information is
regarded as sensitive will be decided by the influences which was presented in the
privacy framework earlier. The prominent influences will be government regulations,
perceptions and situational factors. Information gathered about individuals is per-
sonal and will usually be perceived as sensitive. Regulations will state what types of
information the domain responsible can gather, the level of sensitivity the data has and
for which purposes it can be used. The situational factors will often determine whether
it is acceptable to use information or not. As an example it is, generally speaking, OK
to use information about your medical history if you are injured, but it is not OK to
use that same information for a news paper article.
For a domain responsible two other factors are important, namely legal requirements
and reputation. Reputation is important for companies and bad press resulting from
an application weakness can be expensive. This reflects back on corporate policy and
ethics. Legal requirements imposed by the government obviously have to be followed.
Norwegian law determines that personal information do not belong to the person or
organisation who collected it, but to the person the information is about. This means
that information regarding an individual should be deleted at this individuals request.
4.1.3 Sensitive context information
Context information in MIDAS is information about what you are doing, where you
are, who you are, sensor data like temperature, capabilities you possess and other
5See Section 3.4 for information about domain responsible and the ontology model
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things that can be useful in a domain. This type of information is related to persons
and describes their state. In addition to the obvious threats to privacy by information
in your context, aggregated information threats also have to be considered. MIDAS
can aggregate context information which can create new and unforeseen privacy
issues. This means that the domain responsible must be aware of and investigate these
possibilities and create policies to regulate the information that is gathered.
4.2 User acceptance and sharing of information
The domain responsible wants to give his customers a useful service and make it
popular, which is an important goal for the service if it is to be deemed successful.
In order for context aware services to be accepted by people they must address a
perceived need and be easy to use [12]. This leads to usability requirements on security
functionality. Barkhuus [3] also identifies coolness as a factor of user acceptance.
This means that from a user perspective there exists a trade-off between privacy and
coolness.6
MIDAS represents something new and has potential for a high coolness factor.
This potential exists because MIDAS can provide network services in previously
disconnected areas and have applications that benefits from this. As an example
we envision an application where users cooperate to create information in the form
of videos, text and audio covering a sports event where conventional channels of
information are unavailable.
The study presented by Cranor et. al. [28, pp. 47-55] shows that users are more
likely to share information if they are anonymous. This means that some applications
can increase their usage by not connecting contributed information with users. To
influence this factor it would be beneficial if users were able to select who (among
their personal friends) would be able to view the information they share. In another
study, Acquisti shows that even Facebook users claiming to be privacy aware reveal
a lot of private information, and awareness is only weakly related to the amount of
information that is shared [2].
This means that if people are given the opportunity to share private information they
might do so, not thinking about the consequences. The coolness factor increases
what people are willing to share, making it possible to achieve the desired usage
and information sharing needed for an application to be successful. The domain
responsible must weigh these two factors against each other, determine what the
system needs of information and create routines that preserve reasonable privacy.
4.3 Security analysis of the architecture
Security is not emphasized in the MIDAS project, however, it was stated that the
architecture should be designed in a way so that security could be implemented
without changing the overall structure of the system. The individual components
in MIDAS export well-defined interfaces for communication and flow of control.
6Coolness is a perceived positive factor of novel usage potential
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However, none of the interfaces have any kind of access control or validity checks.
The system assumes that nodes are well behaved. From looking at the architecture
overview (Figure 3.1 in Section 3.3) we see that all the major components use MDS for
storing and retrieving data. The fact that MDS is both readable and writeable for every
node in the network and used by all the other components makes it a logical target for
attacks.
The routing protocol used in MIDAS is also vulnerable since a malicious or malfunc-
tioning node will be able to change the state of the routing tables causing disruption
in the network. Attacks here might bring down entire parts of the network resulting
in Denial of Service.
The MIDAS network is used to route messages from one node to another via a set of
intermediate peer nodes. These messages are transmitted in clear over wireless links
and are prone to modification and information disclosure attacks. Any node capable
of receiving the signal (and of course the intermediate nodes) will be able to read the
message sent. If private or other sensitive information is to be sent in this network this
will have to be mended.
The initial analysis of the architecture shows, three areas that stand out as vulnerable;
MDS, routing, and messaging. A security in depth solution for this system must at
least address these areas.
4.4 Threat model
To assess the security in MIDAS we need to identify the threats to the system. We will
in this section briefly describe these threats, probable attacks and the capabilities of an
adversary. Diaz et al. [13] classifies attackers in the following categories:
• Internal – external
• Passive – active
• Local – global
The internal attacker in MIDAS would be an insider with trust already established in the
system. Insiders would use this trust to gather information available in the network
in order to use it with malicious intent. Disrupting services might also be easier for
an insider depending on whether the network security is based on controlling the
border (only) or a security in depth solution is used. An external attacker would be
somebody which is previously unknown in the network, but who joins the network
with malicious intent. He has no established trust so he will have to gain trust or limit
attacks to vectors not involving trust.
A passive attack would mean to eavesdrop on the network traffic gathering as much
information as possible. Sifting through messages addressed to other nodes or even
just registering source and destination nodes for messages could provide valuable
information to an attacker. Active attacks go further and inject, modify or drop packets
in transit in order to actively alter other nodes perception of reality. Because of this,
active attacks are potentially more devastating.
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The difference between a local and a global attacker is how large a portion of the system
he can see and control. A global attacker sees the entire network and can manipulate
the routing protocol or inject fake packets. Normally users of MIDAS would only ’see’
one-hop neighbours and therefore have a local view. An attacker with a single device
will be classified as local.
Attackers can also be classified according to how risk averse they are [47, pp. 59-72].
The more risk an attacker is willing to take the harder it will be to defend the system.
• Disgruntled employee (insider)
• Determined attacker (outsider)
• Script kiddie (outsider with little resources)
A disgruntled employee have intimate knowledge of the system and some level of access,
making him a powerful adversary. However, his risk aversion might range from low
to high, based on why he is disgruntled. He might not be ready to risk losing his
job, only hurt the company as much as possible. A determined attacker is usually more
resourceful than an insider, have more experience and is normally anonymous making
him less risk averse. The script kiddie has the least amount of resources and is mostly
hacking for fun. He does not necessarily believe or understand that what he does is
wrong and therefore neglects the risk of being caught.
Based on these attacker profiles we see several possible threats that should be
mitigated.
• Attacking the routing protocol
– Flooding the network with traffic
– Replay or inject packets
– Dropping packets
– Disrupting the network, denying services to other users
• Eavesdropping, gather information
• Trying to elevate permissions, gaining access to sensitive information
• Receive services not granted to user (for personal benefit or economic gain)
• Spam
Attacking the routing protocol and eavesdropping the network are general threats that
apply to all MIDAS scenarios where malicious nodes might be present. Elevating
permissions and receiving services are only possible where restricted services or
sensitive information is available in the network, depending on the scenario in
question. Sending spam for commercial or political reasons is for example applicable
where spectators are involved.
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4.5 Summation of different issues in MIDAS
We have seen in this chapter that there are security issues with MIDAS architecture and
the inherent properties of MANETs. The following is a list of issues which sums up
the different security incentives:(These will be addressed in the security requirements
and through the remaining chapters)
Privacy Sensitive information must be protected, but how should sensitive informa-
tion be identified and for how long must it stay private? What information is
considered sensitive will vary between service domain models. Since there is no
central server in MIDAS every node has to evaluate and verify this individually.
Personal information MIDAS will store and aggregate personal information for
participants of the network. According to Norwegian laws7 this information has
to be deleted at the participants request. Personal information includes location
data which will always be available in MIDAS.
Untrusted network topology The network is dynamic and packages will most likely
be sent over untrusted channels.
Ad-hoc routing Routing tables will change, nodes will leave, routing information
must be updated and distributed without being maliciously manipulated.
Lack of Access Control Who is in charge of Access Control? Who owns and control
information? No central authority will be in place to handle this.
Denial of Service Denial of service can be fatal in emergency and rescue and costly in
sports events.
Usability The middleware must be easy to use and allow dynamic setup.
Statistical information Statistical information becomes valuable when a large num-
ber of users connect. The information could be correlated with other data to
identify individuals and used in fraud attempts.
Trust in nodes Regular nodes in the network might not be trusted, but should still be
able to handle data or route messages.
Data integrity The global database is distributed on untrusted nodes, with no central
control enforcing integrity and consistency.
The issues presented above are the main issues so far. They come from the design of
MIDAS and from the environment MIDAS will operate in.
7Norwegian laws are compliant to EU laws and in regard to privacy regarded as stricter
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4.6 How issues affect the thesis
The ethical issues presented in Section 4.1 give rise to ethical requirements presented
in Chapter 5. Other concerns regarding the architecture and overall security issues are
used to determine what functional security is needed. They are also one of the reasons
security is needed in MIDAS. Even if there was no economic incentive for security,
influences like government regulations and public perceptions would still demand a
certain level of security.
This chapter has also shown how applications on the MIDAS middleware can benefit
from a coolness factor and get users exited about the product. Ethical issues is
discussed and evaluated in respect to suggested security measures in Chapter 8.
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MIDAS security requirements
Before making reasonable design decisions about security we need to identify re-
quirements for the services running on the middleware. We present here a list of
requirements for different parts of the system. The requirements are based on the
challenges described in MIDAS Deliverable 1.2 part III [53] and issues identified in
Section 4. Each requirement is given a priority ranging from high (H), medium (M)
and low (L), based on our subjective opinion and evaluation of PoC scenarios. The
list has been verified by members of the MIDAS project. Challenges from MIDAS
Deliverable 1.2 are listed in Appendix A and a full list of the requirements with
comments and cross reference to these challenges can be found in Appendix B.
5.1 Overall
The devices running the MIDAS middleware are usually small and highly portable.
This means that they are easily lost or stolen and might end up in the wrong hands.
Everything stored on the device might then be modified, including stored message or
the MIDAS runtime files themselves.
SR 1 (M) Users must be able to report lost or stolen devices at which point they would
be considered untrusted by the network. Reports should be impossible to deny
or withdraw. Special care to prevent denial of services has to be taken.
SR 2 (M) Data stored on nodes should not be easily available if device is stolen or lost.
SR 3 (M) Users should not be able to elevate their permissions by changing files
locally on device. This includes modifying the middleware software itself.
SR 4 (M) The devices should verify the identity of the user (user authentication) so
that stolen devices are rendered useless.
SR 5 (M) General remote attacks on nodes should not reveal sensitive information to
an attacker.
MIDAS provides services for the masses. This means that it has to be user friendly
and require little technical insight. The users might also in some cases be in a stressful
situation where usability becomes even more important.
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SR 6 (H) Security solutions in MIDAS should be easy to set up, both to allow rapid
network deployment and eliminate the need for technical personnel.
SR 7 (H) Authentication mechanisms must be simple to use for non-technical users.
SR 8 (M) Tools for managing permissions must be intuitive and self explanatory
SR 9 (M) Most security settings should be managed with little or no user involvement.
5.2 Access control
The purpose of the MIDAS network is to enable nodes to share information without
any prior existing infrastructure. Some of this information is gathered and produced
in and by the network (e.g. sensors), and some might be stored locally on nodes
before connecting to the network. Either way some of this information is sensitive and
privacy has to be protected. This includes who should be able to add, read, modify
and delete information from the MDS.
SR 10 (H) Sensitive information must be protected when stored and communicated.
SR 11 (H) There must be limitations as to who gets access to what information.
SR 12 (H) Access granting should be possible both off-line and on-site.
SR 13 (M) The middleware must support well defined roles.
SR 14 (L) Access should be granted to a given role or user. Roles might change
dynamically as users leave or arrive.
One of the functional requirements of MIDAS is to depend on a central node. Without
a central authority access control has to be enforced by every node sharing information
(e.g. storage nodes) and be evaluated according to well defined rules shared by every
node. Information providers should be able to determine who will be allowed access
to the data they generate.
SR 15 (M) Every node should be able to evaluate access permissions and the result
the of evaluation must be the same on all nodes. This includes authentication,
role and permission verification.
SR 16 (M) Users (or applications) providing information into the network should be
able to set access restrictions on the data they provide.
SR 17 (M) Access restrictions should in some cases be possible to bypass.
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5.3 Routing
Nodes in MIDAS should be able to setup an ad-hoc network without any previous
knowledge of each other. Trust relationships between nodes can be established prior
to network creation or on the fly, but this should not be necessary for the network to
form.
SR 18 (H) Nodes must be able to participate in the network without access credentials
having to be established beforehand.
SR 19 (H) Untrusted nodes should be able to handle (store, route) sensitive informa-
tion.
Protecting the middleware at the network layer is complicated by the openness of
wireless communication. Making it difficult for malicious users to do real damage is
important in these open platforms. A malicious node in this setting is a node that
intentionally tries to attack/disrupt the network.
SR 20 (M) MIDAS should protect packets from being modified in transit. Malicious
nodes should not be able to disrupt service, gather information, send false
messages or corrupt the routing protocol (includes dropping, replaying or
injecting packets).
SR 21 (L) Malicious nodes trying to disrupt the service should be detected and locked
out. This has to be done in a way so that obvious denial-of-service attacks are
not possible.
SR 22 (L) Malicious nodes should not be able to gather sensitive information when
routing messages.
5.4 Communication
SR 23 (H) MIDAS must be able to unambiguously determine the source of a message.
SR 24 (M) The trust model between peers in the MIDAS network must support ad-
hoc setup and match any hierarchical structure.
SR 25 (L) Some messages should force returning a receipt upon receiving/reading.
In service domains where security is crucial, trust relationship prior to network
creation should be taken advantage of so that participants can communicate securely.
SR 26 (M) MIDAS needs to support secure communication between nodes trusting
each other without having to trust every routing node in between. This
includes message integrity, data protection, non-repudiation and protection
against replay attacks.
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5.5 Ethical
The ethical requirements cover general properties of the middleware. They state the
intention the middleware should have.
SR 27 (H) Sensitive information (as seen from the system) must be secured to prevent
unwanted exposure.
SR 28 (H) The middleware must protect sensitive information from unauthorized
access.
SR 29 (H) The middleware must protect the integrity of information.
SR 30 (M) Some context information is considered sensitive and should therefore be
protected. This includes aggregated data.
SR 31 (M) Usage of services and peer interaction is sensitive information and must
therefore be protected.
SR 32 (H) Personal information should be deleted at the request of data owner.
SR 33 (M) Users have to be able to see what information they share to others.
SR 34 (H) Users should be warned about what the information they give will be used
for.
SR 35 (M) Default settings must favour a high degree of privacy.
28
Chapter 6
Security building blocks
This chapter describes in detail the security building blocks of our proposed solution
and what they do for the overall security in MIDAS. Figure 6.1 show the original
architecture from Section 3.3 and where security components fit in. The new
components are Signed context certificates, Key server, Row level integrity, Access
control, Signed permission certificates and Cryptographic libraries.
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Figure 6.1: Architecture overview with security building blocks.
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Row level signatures One of the key element of the secure architecure is the row level
signatures (Section 6.2.2) which proves both data origin and integrity. This is
used to secure MDS which is a central part of the MIDAS middleware. The other
components rely on a secure MDS for storing and retrieveing data.
Key server The key server stores public keyrings in MDS so they are available in the
entire network. The component would also implement routines for looking up
keys and finding key chains (described in detail in Section 6.1.3).
Access Control The Access control module (Section 6.3) verifies access permissions
for MDS and other components. By decoupling MDS from Access Control (AC)
we get a clean separation of concerns between the two components and the AC
module can be used by other components as well. Signed permission certificates
(Section 6.3.2) are an integral part of this component.
Common Functions The CFG component provides common functionality to all the
other components and cryptographic library functions needed to implement the
security solution will be placed here. This is not in itself a security building block
so will not be described here, but is discussed in Section 7.5. Typical functions
are message signing, message encryption and signatures verification.
Context Space Signed context certificates (Section 6.4) are not a standalone compo-
nent, but play an important part within the context engine to provide trusted
context that can be the basis for access control.
We will in this chapter first define a trust model that is needed to realise some the
security requirements in MIDAS and base our choice of technology on this. We then
look at different ways to utilise this technology to cover the security requirements and
implement the new components of the architecture.
The requirements referred to in this section can be found in Appendix B and are the
same as the ones described in Chapter 5.
6.1 Trust model
A trust model as defined by Stinson et al. [14, p. 2], describes how entities in a
system can cooperate by looking at the confidence level entities grant each other. In
the real world we might trust people we know, have met before or who have been
recommended through common friends. Capra argue that this should be the basis for
a distributed trust model [6]. He also suggest that trust is individual and a trust model
not allowing users to define their own trust relations are to restrictive. In some MIDAS
service domains the communication in mostly public and the security requirements
are low, whereas others need a high degree of security. Here trust is crucial and has to
be established before the network can be created. Trust should therefore be possible to
establish both in advance and ad-hoc.
6.1.1 Different types of trust models
Two approaches to trust modelling have been identified by Choi et al. [8]:
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• Reputation based, where trust is calculated by looking at transactions (negative
and positive) performed by nodes.
• Trust expressed between users or entities, where users actively established trust
between peers or use a trusted third party to enable trust.
A reputation based system can be automated. However, without a third party to
maintain trust levels, every node has to calculate its own trust parameters for each
node it needs to interact with. Since the MIDAS network has a short lifetime there
might be too little data to base this calculation on.
Trust expressed between users or entities is the approach used in personal X.509 cer-
tificates [20] and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [49]. Both use a Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). The two most common PKI models are the centralized hierarchical PKI [24]
systems and the web-of-trust PKI systems [11].
X.509 is based on the centralised hierarchy model where the root CA certificate is well
known and trusted by all participants. The benefit of this model is the ease of finding
a certificate path. A path exists if one or more certificates higher in the hierarchy can
be used to generate a link between two certificates. This can be seen to the left in
Figure 6.2. Since certificates can be signed by one and only one CA higher in the
hierarchy the complete path can be enclosed within a signed message.
The centralized approach is proposed in the work done by Puzar et al. described in
Section 3.7.2. X.509 is widely supported and the standard in most PKI systems. The
centralised model is however in conflict with a fully distributed system and should
be avoided in MIDAS to get the full benefit of an ad-hoc distributed network. The
most prominent problem is that users cannot control their own trust relationships and
ad-hoc setup is difficult.
PGP [61] is a public key cryptography scheme based on the web-of-trust model. PGP
is fully distributed where users sign each others keys. Signed keys are then stored
on a keyring accompanied by the public key. The web-of-trust model in PGP can be
used to generate an hierarchical structure if needed, but its normal operation is cross-
certification, like the X.509 cross-certification mesh. Using the web-of-trust model in
MANETs has been proposed by Ngai and Lyu [7] who discuss a fully distributed
authentication mechanism based on PGP and natural clustering in mobile networks.
The cross-certification in PGP quickly grows out of control if every user has to sign
every other user key (especially since signing should be done by meeting in person).
Trust in PGP can therefore follow chains of certificate from one user to another1.
Figure 6.2 show the difference between the two models. We see here that a web-of-
trust can express more complex structures, but can grow out of proportion because of
the cross signatures. In the hierarchical model both certificate #1 and #2 can trust each
other via the same chain (by just following the lines in the figure). In the web-of-trust
model, node #3 and #4 have to use different chains to gain mutual trust because trust
relationships are directed (following the arrows in the figure).
1This is a bit simplified. Keys in PGP are assigned a trust level that determine whether a chain can be
followed or not. This is however less relevant in this discussion
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Figure 6.2: Different trust models.
6.1.2 Trust model in MIDAS
We propose to adapt PGP and the web-of-trust model where peers can both verify
and establish trust between each other on the fly. A strict hierarchical structure can be
modeled on top of the web-of-trust (as seen to the right in Figure 6.2) in for instance
the emergency scenario if key initiation is possible before the network is created.
The added benefit is that one or more hierarchies can be linked together using cross-
verification.
PGP uses a key server where public keyrings can be stored. This is a central repository
for finding public keys and certificate chains. The MDS can be used as a simple key
server by adding a table for holding keyrings. The global nature of MDS makes sure
that everyone will have access to search and download public keys. The keyring of a
user should be uploaded to the key server when the middleware starts up and updated
whenever changes occur (e.g. when new keys are signed). As long as MDS is able
to synchronise all storage nodes, this ensures that trust relations in the network are
available to everyone and up to date. This will also ensure that message signatures
can be verified after the signing node has left the network.
In Section 6.3.1 we describe a way to make sure that uploaded keyrings can only be
updated or deleted by the owner of the key. PGP keyrings are meant to be public and
does not require any read restrictions.
The trust model help to achieve Requirement SR 15 by defining how trust should
be evaluated in the network. The use of PGP solves the problem of unambiguously
determining the source of a message (Requirement SR 23).
6.1.3 Building a web-of-trust
An inherit problem with PGP is that the cross certification quickly grows out of
proportion and chains of trust are introduced to reduce this problem. Still, a certain
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amount of signed certificates need to be available for chains to be found.
PGP key signing parties [61] are the normal way for PGP users to expand their web-of-
trust. People having to meet in advance is however not desirable in MIDAS. Instead
nodes could utilise the concept of multichannel security [58] to sign keys fast and
secure. With multichannel security, public keys can be exchanged using infrared links
or another short range channel whenever peers are in direct reach of eachother [4]. A
confirmation of the identity of the person can be done before the key is signed. In this
way new security associations can be establish in a self-organized, distributed fashion.
Notice that the identity claimed in the PGP key has to be verified, since there is no way
for PGP to enforce this on its own.
To create hierarchical structures PGP keys have to be created that are not personal,
but form nodes in a tree (as seen to the right in Figure 6.2). Personal keys are then
signed as children of this node. In the emergency scenario we would model a police
department, district and unit. All police officer keys should trust their units key. This
constructed tree structure and the ad-hoc nature of PGP solves Requirement SR 24.
6.2 Secure data storage
The components in MIDAS, including CRT, CXS and the DPL use the MDS component
for normal operations, storing or retrieving data. If applications cannot store data
without some form of ownership or guarantee of integrity and availability, then all
applications will be vulnerable to injection attacks as well as information stealing.
6.2.1 Data protection
Protecting MDS thus becomes an important part of securing MIDAS. MDS as de-
scribed in the MIDAS documentation [36] has no access control nor notion of
ownership2. All data in the MDS can be modified by any node and all can contribute
data. In a fully distributed system the storage nodes should be selected based on
storage capabilities and position in the network, to optimize availability. This mean
that storage nodes usually are untrusted. Since local access restrictions are possible to
bypass, just by accessing the storage medium, special care has to be taken to prevent
this from becomming a problem. A malicious storage node should not be able to
modify data in the entire storage network.
What is needed is data integrity to verify that data has not been corrupted, data origin
to verify source and data confidentiality to protect sensitive or private data.
6.2.2 Row level signatures
By signing a database operation and storing the signature in the row together with
the data for later verification we introduce the notion of users into the system. Every
row in MDS stores the node id that performed the operation. The signature verifies this
2The MDS scheme has a sourceNodeIdentifier on each insert, delete and update, but this doesn’t mean that
the row is owned by that node
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Table
id nodeid_created ts_created nodeid_changed ts_changed replaced_by record_status signaturetuple_data
id nodeid_created ts_created nodeid_changed ts_changed replaced_by record_status signaturetuple_data
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ......
Figure 6.3: Internal MDS table layout with row level signatures.
information and ensures that data has not been tampered with. The signature uniquely
identifies the node (Requirement SR 23) and ensures integrity (Requirement SR 29).
When data is inserted into the MDS a user will sign the complete row including
metadata fields defined for all MDS tables (see Deliverable 2.2 [36, pp. 17-18]). Figure
6.3 shows the table layout with meta data fields. Generating signatures and attaching
them to the data row as well as verifying signatures should be implemented by the
middleware, so that application developers don’t have to think about it.
1. MDS perform
operation(tuple, sign(tuple))
2. MDS synchronize
operation(tuple, sign(tuple))
3. MDS fetch
tuple, sign(tuple)
Node k
Node s1 Node a
4. MDS fetch
a_keyring
5. validate
tuple, sign(tuple), a_pub
Node s2 Node b
Figure 6.4: Signing database operations against MDS.
Figure 6.4 shows how the communication flows. Node a performs a modify operation
in MDS (insert, update or delete), and signs this. The operation is performed on
node s1 and replicated to node s2. Whether or not signature verification should be
performed on these nodes is an implementation issue. Performing validation makes
sure that fake rows are ignored at an early stage, at the cost of some extra processing
power. Either way it has to be done again by the node reading data because storage
nodes are untrusted. In step 3 and 4, node b request the data stored by node a and
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its corresponding key. Notice that node k is the key server here, but this role could be
performed by both node s1 and s2 since the key server really only is a storage node
with an instance of the keyring tables. In the last step the row is validated before being
accepted on node b.
The drawback of these signatures is an overhead in storage space, network usage and
computational resources. The first two are proportional to the number of operations
to be performed, and constant in relation to the sizes of tuples. The latter overhead
is proportional to the size of a tuple because of the hash algorithm which needs to
be applied to all the data. Which of these factors will be dominant depends of the
size (in bytes) of a typical row. Practical testing is necessary to determine how much
performance is influenced by adding this signature.
6.2.3 Row level encryption of data
To protect sensitive data when stored on untrusted nodes (as described in Sec-
tion 4.1.2), it is necessary to encrypt it. PGP supports an efficient encryption scheme
where a symmetric onetime session key is generated to encrypt data [61]. The session
key is then encrypted using the PGP public key and attached with the encrypted
data. The encrypted data can be stored in the database as binary data. To save
computational overhead, only columns containing sensitive data need to be encrypted.
The metadata of a row cannot be encrypted as it is needed by the storage node when
doing synchronisation.
Adding encryption to MDS will create overhead in storage and require more process-
ing time, as well as increasing battery consumption, which is a limited resource on
hand-held devices. Another drawback with encrypting data stored in a SQL database
is that the query engine will not be able to operate on encrypted data. Encrypted data
has to be stored as a blob and decrypted at the client [43, pp. 8-9]. Clients therefore
have to know exactly which data key to look up. The performance impact might also
be substantial because of the increased work of data encryption.
Encryption keys have to be managed separately, since storage nodes are considered
untrusted. Nodes trying to read the encrypted data will have to request the key from
a node trusted to distribute it (e.g. data owner). If access is granted, the session key
is encrypted using the requesting nodes public key and the node become trusted to
further manage the key.
The result is that sensitive data can be stored in MDS without being compromised,
solving Requirement SR 19 by allowing untrusted nodes to store sensitive information
and Requirement SR 2, SR 10 and SR 27 by protecting the data if exposed. For some
application the overhead will therefore be acceptable.
6.2.4 Database inconsistency
Even if we sign every database operation, malicious storage nodes still have full
control over its own database and can delete rows locally, disregarding data changes.
These database inconsistencies will only be a problem for the set of nodes using
the malicious node as its closest storage node, because the append only database
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in MIDAS will not allow these changes to propagate in the network. This threat
can be mitigated by querying multiple storage nodes and comparing the results, but
that would add additional overhead to the system. The relaxed database consistency
demands in MIDAS allows for this kind of inconsistency when network partitions
appear or are merged, so the problem is not uncommon. The MDS synchronisation
feature should be able to handle this.
6.2.5 Storage media data protection
Data can be corrupted on the storage medium locally on a node and checksums should
be used to detect these corruptions. When the middleware is starting up or if lost or
stolen devices are retrieved, these checksums would validate the integrity of data. The
checksums do however need to be signed to prevent malicious modification since an
attacker would be able to regenerate valid checksums. A hierarchy of checksums could
be used to minimize the job needed when data is inserted or updated. This is what is
done in git’s object database [17].
If sensitive information has to be protected on lost or stolen devices (Require-
ment SR 2), then the data has to be encrypted. This would mean that a symmetric
session key should be used to encrypt the entire database and the session key protected
using the private key in the node. Research done on encrypted file systems indicate
that the overhead will be manageable [32], however battery consumption and slow
CPUs are not taken into account.
Both of these schemes might be to expensive with regards to performance to be
implemented at all and it may not even be deemed necessary to protect against
these kinds of risks. Both schemes also require that the private key in the node isn’t
compromised when control of the device is lost. Solving this will introduce more
inconveniences to the users and possibly new security challenges.
6.3 Access control
Without access control in MDS we can envision scenarios where malicious nodes can
inject, change or delete3 data to stop programs from functioning properly. This can be
done by writing own applications using the API directly or by maliciously modifying
the middleware software itself. Data can also be modified during data synchronisation
between storage nodes. What is needed is an access control mechanism to determine
what operations (insert, read, update, delete) a node is able to perform.
In Section 6.2.2 we described a way of signing database rows to be able to uniquely
identify which user performed a given database operation. With this notion of users,
implementing an access control module becomes possible. Here we introduce three
schemes with different properties that can be combined to support a both efficient and
fine-grained access control implementation. Both presented schemes are based on the
trust network and the use of PGP keys. Users will therefore not be able to elevate
permission by changing files locally, solving Requirement SR 3.
3Data can only be flagged as deleted in MIDAS, since the database is append only. This is still a problem
since we cannot verify who deleted the row
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MIDAS services have different needs for access control. Seitz and Pierson looks at
different access control models [1] and what problem they solve.
• Discretionary access control
• Mandatory access control
• Role based access control
Discretionary access control (DAC) says that the owner of an object decides who has
access. The table policies is a more strict version of this model. Role based access control
(RBAC) grant permissions to roles and assigns roles to users or groups. This is the
model used in row level authorisation. Both schemes are described later in this section.
6.3.1 Table policies
By introducing a concept of data owner, we can implement a row level authentication
and authorisation scheme for MDS. The data owner is the node that initially inserted
a row with a given identifier and for some tables only the data owner needs to be able
to modify or delete. The most prominent example is tables with context information,
where only the node itself should be able to edit its own context information. Since
only the data owner is given write access to these rows, MDS nodes can deny requests
made by any other node, keeping the data consistent. This can also be used to protect
the PGP public keyring (Section 6.1.2). Another example is the DPL module, which
stores binary packages in MDS. Only the deployment administrator node should be
able to update or modify these packages.
To implement this scheme, rules have to be encoded in the database definition schema,
defined for each table. These rules should be maintained by a separate AC module,
since the built in database control scheme cannot be used to evaluate these kinds of
permissions. The AC module should evaluate whether a given operation should be
permitted or not. Figure 6.5 shows how the control flows. When receiving an update
request the storage node will check the policy for the given table. If verification is
needed, the public keyring of the sourceNodeIdentifier is fetched either from local cache
or MDS. Then signature is verified, and the operation is either accepted or rejected.
Operations with bad signatures will be discarded directly.
The solution is simple and relatively cheap, but is lacking fined-grained control, since
only data owner has full access.
6.3.2 Row level authorisation
Seitz et al. describe an access control scheme meant for sharing medical data in a grid
environment [48]. This paper describes a very similar environment to MIDAS, where
patients own their medical journals and should be able to distribute access permissions
for this data. What is proposed is a permission certificate which is signed with the
patients private key. The certificate can be validated by anyone who have access to
the public key, and the format of the certificate allows for fine-grained configuration.
Figure 6.6 shows how such a permission certificate will be generated and a signed
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1. MDS 
update(tuple, signed(tuple))
2. MDS 
fetch(a_keyring)
Node s Node aNode k
3. 
check table policy, control data owner,
validate(tuple, signed(tuple), a_pub),
store tuple or reject update
Figure 6.5: Table policy access permission checks.
example can be found in Appendix C. In this solution private/public keys are used to
identify users (or data owner). Access is granted to a unique public key.
classiﬁcation of the data produced at diﬀerent medical services (but note here
that such an ontology does not currently exist globally, but this research ﬁeld is
very active today, see the US Uniﬁed Medical Language System for instance [19]).
We deﬁne Semantic Access Certiﬁcates (SAC) as electronic documents that
contain the following info mation (see ﬁgure 1):
– an unique identiﬁer of the doctors that are granted access,
– an unique identiﬁer of the patient granting access,
– an unique identiﬁer of the data or class of data to which access is granted,
– the allowed modes of access,
– a validity period,
– and the electronic signature of the entity granting the rights.
concatenation
Owners private keyEncryption 
Hash value
         Cryptographical
Hash (e.g. SHA1, MD5 etc.)
Certificate’s signature
Signed Access Certificate
Unique identifier
of entities granted
access rights
Unique identifier
Identifier of the
data access is
granted to
Allowed
modes of
access
validity 
period
of owner of the
concerned data
Certificate
Fig. 1. Components of a signed access certiﬁcate
Let us now detail and argue each of the ﬁelds present in this certiﬁcate.
First appears the doctor (or the group) for whom the certiﬁcate has been
issued : For a single doctor its public key may be used as unique identiﬁer,
management of groups of medical staﬀ is done through trusted authorities that
issue group membership certiﬁcates.
Similarly, the unique identiﬁer of the patient may be its public key.
Creating unique identiﬁers for ﬁles can be done by concatenating the patient
identiﬁer with a hash (MD5, SHA1, ...) of the ﬁle content (or the semantic class
name). The semantic value transported with the certiﬁcate when classes of access
are given that way allows for a much more ﬂexible and easy to use system. The
users can thus eﬀectively give access to entire part of his medical data. The
classiﬁcation of data allows to give access rights based on semantical criterions,
Figure 6.6: Signed permission certificate for row level access control4.
In MIDAS this can be implemented by having a table for storing permission certificates
and using SQL foreign keys to link data rows with permissions. In the grid
environment Seitz et al. assumed that the storage servers where trustworthy. This
implies that all operations (read, write, update and delete) can be secured via this
access control scheme. Since storage nodes are untrusted in MIDAS5, only update
and delete can be controlled this way. Write permission cannot be easily solved with
this scheme, but for read control the entire row can be encrypted (as described in
Section 6.2.3). The permission certificates can be issued both off-line and on-site and
therefore solves Requirement SR 11 and SR 12. They can be set by users or applications,
solving Requirement SR 16 and can be granted directly to users or to a role (a given
context) solving Requirement SR 13 and SR 14.
4Used with permission [48].
5Implicitly stated in Requirement SR 19
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Since MDS is append only, each primary key will have a set of records depending on
how many updates there have been. When an application receive data from MDS it
can check the signature attached to the row to verify integrity and identify the node
who inserted it. By checking the permission certificate they can further verify that the
change was legit. Rows not fulfilling these requirements will be discarded. Since the
storage node cannot be trusted, this has to be done by the node itself.
In addition to the storage and computational overhead, this solution introduces a
drawback of reasoning about the state of data. The solution requires each node to
compare signatures and permission certificates to evaluate whether or not the change
is legitimate. Since nodes have different web-of-trust networks and base their evalu-
ation on their own keyring the possibility of nodes evaluating permissions differently
can occur, which will lead to inconsistency and conflicts with Requirement SR 15.
It might be possible to solve this by setting some restrictions on who a permission
certificate can grant access to. For instance if evaluation could be done from the
viewpoint of the owners keyring, the evaluation would be disambiguous. We will
not look into how this can be done here.
6.3.3 Row level encryption and session keys
Since any node in MIDAS can take the role as storage node there will inevitably be
situations where the storage node cannot be trusted. Since any node has full access to
local resources, sensitive data has to be encrypted if privacy is to be protected. Seitz
et al. [1] have described a solution where data is stored in a grid environment where
storage nodes in the grid are untrusted. The solution uses private/public keys like in
our proposed solution, encrypt data on a row basis using a session key and introduce
a trusted key server for managing access to these session keys. This is very similar to
what we want to do in MIDAS where data should be stored globally without being
available to everyone, including the nodes it is stored on.
The method proposed by Seitz et al. is designed to operate with any access control
scheme so it will work with the permission certificates described earlier. As described
in Section 6.2.3 all tuple data of a row will have to be encrypted, with the implications
described there. In the MIDAS network, if no trusted key server is available then the
data owner can himself act as a key server. In this way the system will continue to work
in a fully distributed manner, but can take advantage of supporting infrastructure
where available. By using session keys stored separate from the data we solve
Requirements SR 10 and SR 19 which states that untrusted nodes should be able to
handle (store or route) sensitive data. We also protect sensitive information from
unauthorized access (Requirement SR 28).
6.3.4 Where to evaluate Access Control
We have already seen that access permissions should be verified by the requesting
nodes because of untrusted storage nodes. However if no validation is done at the
storage nodes, garbage data might be inserted by malicious nodes. To prevent this,
storage nodes could do the same evaluation and deny operations that do not validate.
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This leads to a more consistent database and less work for the user nodes. The cost of
this is slower modify operations since more processing has to be done.
If every node evaluates operations themselves then the result of evaluation will
depend on the network of trusted peers for any given user. This will result in
inconsistencies between nodes as they trust different sets of nodes. This is OK in
MIDAS, since database consistency is relaxed as it is. If however, evaluation is to
be done at the storage nodes, then the result has to be the same as if it was evaluated
by the data owner. That is, no ambiguities must be allowed.
If only the data owner should be able to modify data, the evaluation is straight
forward. The signature is simply verified using the key associated with the source
node. However, when permission certificates are used, permission will have to be
evaluated from a certain perspective (e.g. a given public keyring).
6.3.5 Central nodes
Even though MIDAS should be able to operate completely ad-hoc, there is a need for
central nodes that should be taken advantage of if trusted. The central node can take
on the responsibility of validating permissions and distributing session keys, taking
the workload off small and mobile devices.
If an completely trusted central node also acts as a storage node then the work of
verifying signatures can be placed here, relieving the user nodes of a lot of overhead.
6.4 Trusted context information
In the current version of MIDAS, context is fully controlled by the user and without
signed records it would be possible for one node to set the context of another. In
a closed network where all participants are known (and trusted) in advance this
approach might work. This is an assumed precondition in the solution by Puzar,
for the emergency scenario described in Section 3.7.2. We want to eliminate this
assumption in our solution.
With the mechanism of signing database operations as described in Section 6.2.2 we
ensure that users can no longer set context for others. However, in our fully distributed
network, users still have full control of their own context. We propose to specify
a signed context certificate adapting the approach of signed permission certificates
described by Seitz et al. [48] introduced in Section 6.3.2. This context certificate should
state what context is set by the certificate, for which node it applies, validity period
and signing authority. Figure 6.7 shows how a context certificate would be created.
By checking the signature of the context certificate it would be possible to verify the
entire certificate. If the key used is trusted we can also trust the context set by this
certificate. The signing authority does not have to be the same as owner. For instance
in the emergency scenario a master key could be generated for each local police unit
or department. This key would be used to issue context certificates in advance and
would be trusted by every policy officer in that department. Figure 6.8 shows how a
hierarchy of keys and certificates can be created for the emergency scenario. Here a
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Figure 6.7: Signed context certificate6.
police officer hold both a PGP key signed by the department master key and a context
certificate signed by the same key. The department key can be used to sign other keys
to extend the trust network.
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Figure 6.8: Signed context certificates in a constructed hierarchy.
The certificates can be used to define roles in a RBAC system. Combined with
permission certificates described in Section 6.3.2 they help to solve Requirements
SR 11, SR 12, SR 13 and SR 14.
This model has great flexibility, but create additional overhead for context querying,
if context has to be verified. For some context this overhead is acceptable (verifying
6Based on Seitz [48]
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the context Police officer makes it possible to send sensitive information). For other
context information (e.g. Having breakfast, unavailable for discussions) this might not be
needed. Context information derived from sensor information might change so often
that creating a context certificate for each new state might not even be feasible. Because
of these issues, signed context certificates must be optional and verification enforced
in the application, rather than the middleware.
6.5 Secure communication
Since MIDAS uses wireless links for communication it is possible to both eavesdrop,
modify and insert traffic into the network. This means that traffic should be protected
in transit. Security primitives needed are data integrity, data confidentiality, data
origin authentication, non-repudiation and protection against replay attacks.
6.5.1 Network packets
On the network layer there is a need for data integrity. This can be done using a simple
hash-function (like sha-1) to checksum packets. Checksums are relatively cheap both
to generate and verify. However they do not protect against maliciously modified
packets, only random data corruption. Packets could instead be signed using the PGP
key to solve this. The signature both verify the content of the packet and which node
sent it. Nodes forwarding these packets does not necessary need to trust the key with
which the packet was signed. Knowing only that the same key signed all packets and
that they where not modified during transport would still increase the overall security.
Packets without a valid signature should be dropped.
All packets in MIDAS also have a timestamp and a TTL. Replay attacks can be
thwarted by storing packet signatures for the specified TTL. Messages matching a
stored signature can be discarded. Signatures should be checked on every node in its
path toward the receiver. By discarding false packets as early as possible bandwidth
can be saved at the expense of processing power. As we will see in Section 6.7.1, this
also makes it possible to detect malicious nodes. The use of signatures and TTL solves
replaying, injecting or modifying packets from Requirement SR 20.
6.5.2 Routing protocol messages
MIDAS nodes exchange routing information at regular intervals to detect new nodes
and update routing information for mobile devices moving around. The information
is used to keep an up to date routing table on each node. Protecting the state of the
routing protocol from malicious modification is important for the network to operate
efficiently, but difficult to do in practice.
When receiving routing messages a node will want to verify the sender of the message.
This means that all routing messages should be signed with the private key of the
node, making it harder to attack the routing protocol state by injecting routing packets
(Requirement SR 20). Echo packets and heartbeat protocols can be used to discover
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outdated or erroneous routing state.
6.5.3 Application messages
The MIDAS middleware routes application messages between nodes. These messages
might contain a request for work to be done or simply contain a human readable
message and should be signed to verify data origin and integrity (Requirement SR 23
and SR 29). When auditing records are generated the signature should be stored
with the messages for later verification. By signing a message we also achieve non-
repudiation (from Requirement SR 26). This means that when a message is sent, the
sender can no longer claim that the message was not sent by him.
Data does not need to be signed both at the network and middleware layer so a
mechanism for applications to choose only one would save bandwidth and processing
power.
Message confidentiality is used to make sure that only the intended receiver of a
message is able to read its content, which is needed for Requirement SR 10 and SR 27.
This is done using the encryption scheme in PGP as described in Section 6.2.3. Sending
encrypted messages is rather expensive, both with regards to processing power and
increased use of bandwidth. Only messages containing sensitive information should
be encrypted.
6.5.4 Securing context addressable messages
When sending CAM the address of all recipients might not be known and obtaining
the public key for these recipients becomes impossible. Since the public key is not
available, the method described in Section 6.2.3 of encrypting the session key cannot
be used. Nodes receiving encrypted CAM messages would have to actively request
the session key.
A novel method, giving full control over who gets access to the key, would be to send
these requests back to the message origin. This however, does not scale well with a
lot of recipients. Spreading the load of re-encrypting the session key on the nodes
that has already received it would scale much better. It then has to be assumed that
nodes receiving the key is also trusted enough to redistribute it. Figure 6.9 shows how
the load of encrypting the session key can be distributed on the nodes receiving the
message. Each node encrypt the session key with n (n = 2 in the figure) different
public keys in each phase. This scale well in theory. In MIDAS the topology of the
network has to be taken into account as well, but this is out of scope for this thesis.
6.5.5 Message received verification
For some applications there is a need for the sender to verify that a message is
received and read (Requirement SR 25). The recipient must sign an acknowledgment
upon opening and send it back to the original sender. This approach is described in
RFC2634 [19] and by Coffey and Saidha [9]. A problem with this simple approach
is enforcing the recipient to reply. The sender would need a timeout, after which
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Figure 6.9: Distributing the load of sending encrypted CAM messages.
it will resend the message assuming it was lost. If no receipt is received than the
sender will have to assume that the message did not reach its destination. This can
happen since MIDAS makes no guaranties as to message delivery. Coffey and Saidha
describe a more elaborate system involving a trusted third party, where recipients have
to acknowledge fetching the message, solving the problem of forcing the recipient to
reply. As this require a trusted third party, it is not suitable for MIDAS.
If this security primitive is needed it should be implemented at the application layer
as it would not be needed in most service domains.
6.6 Authentication
Authenticating a user is important to prevent lost or stolen devices to be used for
mischief. Authentication has to be done on different levels to service different needs.
We suggest a solution where when a node connects to the network it will prompt for
a private key to use for communicating securely. By presenting a valid private key
the user authenticates towards the device. The devices will recognise the user based
on the fact that he has the private key and knows the pass phrase. User-to-device
authentication is required by SR 4. If the user does not already have a private key one
will be generated by the middleware. This key will have no established trust in the
network so it will only give access to public information. Since users can generate a
key on the fly, Requirement SR 18 is fulfilled.
When you use a private key to send messages and retrieve data you authenticate to the
network. You sign your request with your private key and the network will validate
this signature and grant access based on your web-of-trust relations. With a generated
key all restricted access requests will be denied.
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Middleware to middleware authentication or node peer authentication can be done
when one node wants to authenticate another node in the network. This could
be appropriate for instance before initiating MDS data synchronisation. A signed
timestamp or a protocol based on a challenge/response scheme with nonces can be
used to confirm that the private key is available to the other node.
Last, if a high level of security is needed, the device should authenticate itself towards
the user. That is, the device should confirm to the user that the hardware and software
has not been tampered with and can be trusted. This is probably the hardest problem
to fix and many solutions has been suggested for what is called a trusted computing
platform [40]. Most solutions require some tamper proof hardware to be placed in the
device that can do validation before the software starts. A simpler solution would be
to use a read only medium for storing the software, but this would not be as secure.
6.7 Misbehaving nodes
Nodes might misbehave due to misconfiguration, virus infection or when operated
by a malicious user. Either way we want to limit the amount of damage that can be
done, while not opening up for new security weaknesses like allowing for easy denial
of service. In any given scenario the number of malicious nodes will presumably be
low. If a large amount of malicious nodes (a significant percentage) exist, we probably
won’t be able to protect the network anyway. All we can do in this situation is to
protect sensitive information from leaking.
Problems that occur when trying to protect the network and the routing protocol
include:
• Detecting nodes that misbehave
• Limiting the damage done by misbehaving nodes.
• Making sure that DoS attacks, by getting nodes blocked, is not possible
6.7.1 Detecting misbehaving nodes
If nodes is programmed to check the signature and TTL of received packets, corrupt
or malicious packets are dropped as soon as possible. Additionally we can draw some
conclusions whenever we receive a packet with a bad signature: Either the packet
was corrupted during its last transmission, or the previous node did not behave as it
should have done, which was to drop the packet.
A certain amount of faulty signatures must be allowed due to random corruption
by the wireless link, but malicious nodes could be identified this way (solving the
detection part of SR 21). More research needs to be done to verify how effective this
approach might be.
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6.7.2 Handle misbehaving nodes
When misbehaving nodes are detected the middleware has to determine what to do
with them. Blocking out nodes is undesirable because of the danger of detecting
false positives that block out legitimate users. A novice approach would be to send
a message to the user of a misbehaving node. This scheme has been tested by the
police in Amsterdam where SMS messages are sent to stolen phones on a regular
basis [56, p. 27]. The messages act as a deterrent, making the phones difficult to resell.
Unsuspecting MIDAS users will in this fashion become aware that their device might
need reconfiguring. Malicious users that tries to disrupt services will receive what can
only be considered as spam which may act as a deterrent.
Another approach is to use the features of the routing protocol to adjust the cost
of routing via the misbehaving node. By routing via other nodes whenever this is
possible, the amount of damage that can be done by malicious nodes is limited. This
partially solves Requirement SR 21. The possibilities of harming legit nodes are small
and malicious nodes are handled, but not locked out. Packets coming from a malicious
node can still be accepted if the signature can be verified.
By allowing a malicious node to stay in the network we are still vulnerable to DoS
attacks where a node flood the network with false signatures that have to be verified
before they can be discarded. This is slightly worse than nodes trying to jam the
network frequency, which is always possible, even if nodes are blocked out [51]. This
will however only affect nodes in the immediate proximity of the misbehaving node.
6.8 Node identification
In the MIDAS middleware it is critical that node identifiers are unique. Each node
is also associated with a number of network endpoints [39, pp. 14-17] that is used to
address a given node based on the selected network technology. Mapping services
maintain information on how to look up endpoints from node identifiers and back.
If PGP is used as a cryptographically secure way of identifying a node an additional
mapping is needed between node id and public key.
To avoid this additional mapping, the fingerprint of the public key [61] can be used
as node identifier. The fingerprint is a 42 character excerpt of the public key and the
chance of collision with other keys is relatively small. The fingerprint is available when
the middleware is booting which is a requirement in the current version of the MIDAS
middleware [39, pp. 14] and fits in the reserved 64 character field.
Since all nodes should upload their public key to MDS when they connect to the
network, the PGP real name can be used as an human readable mapping between
names and node ids. (NB: Notice how PGP Real name are not necessarily unique.)
The node id will be set when the middleware starts by reading the keypair given. If
no key is provided then one will be generated.
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6.9 Certificate revocation
When using private/public key cryptography it is often an issue with public key
(or certificate) revocation. The need exists because private keys get lost or are
otherwise compromised and the owner of the key would like to revoke the use of
the corresponding public key. For PGP this is done by issuing a revocation certificate
that needs to be distributed to all users of the public key. Usually this means updating
your public key on the key server.
For MIDAS the revocation certificate should be uploaded to MDS and the middleware
should check for revocation certificates at regular intervals. Revocation certificates
solves Requirement SR 1.
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Chapter 7
Different configurations
This chapter shows how the building blocks from Chapter 6 can be put together to
achieve different levels of security and which security requirements are solved by
each configuration. The four configurations are: Baseline, Pre-installed certificates,
Signing database operations and Signed context- and permission certificates. The
configurations are mentioned in an increasing level of security.
7.1 Baseline
The MIDAS middleware sets up a distributed, ad-hoc network and in Section 6.1
we argue that to enable security in this network the web-of-trust model should be
used to establish trust between peers. This is implemented using private/public
key cryptography and cross certificate signing. We propose to use PGP, but X.509
certificates can also be used. Every node needs a PGP key to enter the network and
the public keyring should be made available to the network.
This is our minimal configuration which generates the least amount of change to the
original architecture. The performance impact is also kept at a minimum. What is
needed is PGP libraries available for the middleware, the integration of a key needed
to boot the middleware software and tables in MDS to store public keyrings.
With this relatively simple baseline we still have the opportunity to implement some
useful security features.
Distributed public key server All nodes upload their public keyring when the mid-
dleware is starts up. Storing this keyring in the MDS makes it available for all
nodes also after the node has left the network.
Auditing Without some kind of cryptographic signature it is nearly impossible to
create an audit log that can be trusted. When messages are signed, this signature
can verify that the content of the audit record hasn’t been tampered with. By
attaching a signature we both identify the node that generated the audit record
and ensure the integrity of the stored information.
Unique node identifier The private key used by the middleware can also be the
basis for a unique node id. MIDAS uses the node id to map between network
49
CHAPTER 7. DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS
endpoints and nodes. The fingerprint of the private key is an ideal candidate for
node id because of the low probability of collisions.
Application level security By having public keys available in MDS and knowing that
all nodes have a private key, application developers can add functionality that
utilise this to increase the security of the application. For applications that need
a high degree of security this means that e.g. full message encryption will be an
possibility. Possible application features include:
• Secure messaging system with full encryption.
• Application level access control based on trust network. (Implemented
outside the middleware)
• Sender id verification for messages (including CAM).
• Sensitive information can be stored encrypted in MDS.
Application level access control can for instance be utilized by third party
applications where services have to be paid for. Paying customers would register
their public key when they purchase the service making it possible for the
application to verify that the customer actually has paid for the service it receives.
Combined with using the private key as the basis for node id this ensure that
customers cannot abuse the services by sharing their credentials with friends.
7.2 Pre-installed certificates
The most outspread use of X.509 certificates is to secure web traffic using https to
identify websites and encrypt traffic data. This work by having a trust list [27] of
approved top-level certificates installed in the Internet browsers. We can imagine
using the same technique in MIDAS where the middleware comes pre-installed with a
list of approved keys. However, PGP was not intended to be used in this way, so there
is no way to automatically accept these keys, they have to be signed manually. When
they are, they can be used by for instance the deployment module to verify origin of
packages or to distribute official information in the Sports scenario.
Packages distribution By having pre-installed certificates bundled with the middle-
ware application packages they can be signed by application developers and
verified before installed on the mobile device 1. This ensures that it will be harder
for attackers to insert malware or other malicious application packages in the
network.
Official information For the Sports scenario there is little need for trust between
spectators. They probably don’t know each other anyway. What is needed is
the possibility to send out official information that can be verified by spectators
and therefore be trusted. This is done by distributing a public key in advance
for instance on the official website. This key is then used to verify all official
messages.
1This approach is taken on the Apple iPhone where developers can buy a developer key
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7.3 Signed database operations
With signed database operations the system gets integrity checks and data origin in
MDS and information there can be validated by the middleware framework. The
signature should protect the metadata of a row as well as the actual content and should
be used both for MDS synchronisation and when data is being queried by nodes.
Data row integrity By signing database rows the integrity of both the metadata and
the actual content is maintained.
Data owner One of the key benefits of signed rows in the database is the introduc-
tion of data owner. The metadata of MDS rows in MIDAS already include
sourceNodeIdentifier, but this field is currently not used to associate data with an
owner and can be faked. By signing the row, this field can be verified and table
policies be defined.
Table policy access control A simple form of access control can be implemented by
allowing only data owner to perform changes to data. This simple scheme can be
used to store the PGP public keyring, making MDS an effective PGP key server
where keys belong to the key owner and cannot be deleted by others.
Signed context data When using signatures on rows, simple context parameters can
be stored without malicious nodes being able to modify them.
Another main advantage of this scheme is that it only introduces minor changes to
MDS and does not interfere with how data is being stored or replicated. It is possible
to extend the existing MDS component with a module which will handle verification
transparent to the application programmer.
7.4 Signed context- and permission certificates
In Section 6.3.2 we described signed permission certificates based on the work done
by Seitz et al. [48] and in Section 6.4 we extended this solution to create signed context
certificates. Together they form a basis for a fine-grained and flexible RBAC access
control system. Roles in RBAC systems can be mapped to context in MIDAS.
Role based access control Data stored in MDS can be associated with a permission
certificate stating which user or context is needed to access the data (the
certificate also includes mode of access). Users with a signed context certificate
will be allowed access to the data. Access is granted when the following
restrictions are met:
• The signature of the context certificate (signing authority) can be verified
• The signing authority can be trusted
• The requesting node is verified to be the subject of the context certificate.
• The signature of permission certificate can be verified.
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• Permission certificate grants access to context in context certificate.
Using permission- and context certificates impose a significant performance degrada-
tion as the principles involved require several messages to be sent (if public keyrings
have to be fetched), signatures have to be verified and extra bytes has to be sent over
the network and stored.
7.5 Library functions in CFG
We saw that by using PGP keys in all nodes, security features can be implemented by
application developers. This includes sending encrypted messages, verifying message
signatures, sender identification or even a custom access control scheme. Much of
these functions can and should be placed in the CFG library so that application
developers do not have to implement these on their own in each of the applications
that need it. We do not regard this as a configuration on its own, but rather a
description of how we want to make security measures available for developers.
Secure messaging Instead of having to explicitly sign or encrypt messages, applica-
tion developers should only need to set a level of security needed for any given
message and the middleware will take care of fetching public keys, signing,
encrypting and verifying.
Encrypting database rows Full data encryption is supported by PGP, so the CFG
should provide a way to encrypt sensitive information before storing it in MDS.
Access to the data encryption key must be handled by a trusted node (e.g. data
owner). The metadata of the node cannot be encrypted, only the actual data of
the row. Only rows containing sensitive information should be encrypted since
encrypted data cannot be searched by the SQL query engine.
Distributed key server In our baseline configuration MDS acts as an distributed key
server by storing public keyrings for all nodes. By signing database operations
we also get a limited form of access control for these keyrings. However, a
key server should also enable searching for keys based on a number of criteria
and finding certificate chains from one certificate to another. This can be
implemented as a set of common functions.
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Evaluation and Discussion
This chapter presents an evaluation of the work we have done and a discussion of
the results of our solution. The evaluation looks at what we did, how well we think
we covered the parts and what we recommends for future work. The discussion
justifies and explains some of the decisions taken in earlier chapters. We discuss the
overall issues like the value of our research, whether it is feasible to implement the
solution, which weaknesses still exist and point out what our solution does better than
similar approaches. At the end of the discussion we argue for a reasonable division of
responsibility between the middleware and the applications.
8.1 Evaluation of State of the art chapters
The State of the art portion of this thesis required both study of similar systems (peer-
to-peer and mobile ad-hoc networks) and previous research of those systems, as well
as a comprehensive study of the MIDAS documentation. We focused mainly on the
specifics of the architecture and the functionality provided by the middleware when
reading the documentation. Many of the individual parts of MIDAS had similarities
to other known problems. We could, however, not find any papers where these parts
where combined to create a middleware. The main sources we used were IEEE Xplore,
ACM Digital Library and Google Scholar. ACM and IEEE represent well established
and recognised sources of high quality, and Google Scholar represents the diversity as
it combines many sources with good searchability.
8.2 Ethical discussion
The ethical discussion presented in Chapter 4 is an approach to security background,
as stated earlier. We wanted to examine what influences security, how information is
handled and which factors are critical to success. The ethical ramifications introduced
in MANETs have not been as widely researched as other areas of computing. We
therefore used an ethical framework from the database/interactive marketing domain
where information interaction is in focus. We used the framework to identify potential
ethical issues.
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With more time and experience we could probably have found more ethical issues and
made better ethical requirements. The number of ethical requirements that actually
were fulfilled was small, which might be because of their wording or the difficult
environment MANETs have.
8.3 Security requirements
The security requirements identified in Chapter 5 are based on concerns expressed in
MIDAS Deliverable 1.2 partIII [53]1, ethical issues described in Chapter 4, our security
analysis of the architecture in Section 4.3 and common sense when looking at systems
needed to handle sensitive information.
However, a more formal approach might have yielded a better result and given a
documented process over how security requirements where identified. A reasonable
approach would have been to do a risk analysis of the two PoC scenarios in MIDAS
and used this to specify requirements. Some of the requirements are also overlapping
so a more concise formulation would have been beneficial. A reformulation after the
solution was formed would be adapting requirements to the solution, which is a risky
approach.
The requirements focus a lot on handling sensitive information and how confidential-
ity is important. These requirements originate from the emergency scenario. There
is however little focus on verifiable context which is at the heart of MIDAS and
became an important part of our solution. For future MIDAS scenarios, integrity
and verifiability might prove as important as confidentiality and should have been
emphasized more in the requirements.
The security requirements where validated by security experts working on the MIDAS
project who didn’t protest to the formulation, so they are certainly not wrong. We
feel that the requirements are both relevant and cover most needs in MIDAS which
is more important than achieving a high percentage of covered requirements. Which
requirements are met and in which configuration can be found in Table 8.1.
8.4 Security building blocks
A driving force for our security building blocks was the MIDAS requirement of no
central authority or trusted third party, and the possibility for fast and ad-hoc setup.
We feel we have achieved this using the web-of-trust model which is ideal for this type
of network. By choosing to use PGP as the technology to implement the web-of-trust,
we were able to solve requirements regarding integrity, data origin and confidentiality
both in messaging and for data stored in MDS.
We describe two access control schemes, a simple table policy model ideal to protect
data with only one owner, and a more elaborate scheme with permission certificates
to define fine-grained access control levels. Both can be used at the same time for
different types of data. The simple table policies are part of our own contribution
1See Appendix A
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whereas the permission certificates are described by other researchers. Both are
appropriate for the MIDAS middleware.
The presented building blocks form a complete solution to the security requirements
from Chapter 5, however, some areas of the solution have potential for improvements.
Specifically the protection of the routing protocol. The solution has not been verified
using a proof of concept implementation nor a security assessment. This would have
helped proving the effectiveness of the solution. We also assume that some security
mechanisms are too expensive, in terms of overhead, to implement. Laboratory
research could have been done to verify this claim however time limitations prohibited
this.
8.5 Configuration options
The building blocks of Chapter 6 form a complete solution with high degree of security.
This level of security might not be desirable for all MIDAS service domains, because
of the performance impact and loss of usability. We therefore adapted a modular
approach and describe how the building blocks can be put together in different
configurations based on specific security needs. This is useful both when security
mechanisms are to be incorporated in the MIDAS middleware and for a domain
responsible developing a new ontology service model. The different configurations
should suit most security needs ranging from no need to a high need.
8.6 Research value
The MIDAS project has design constraints and application requirements not found
in any other projects so the overall security solution for this environment combines
concepts in new and innovative ways. The requirements that are together forms
the uniqueness of MIDAS are: the ad-hoc network model with no central authority,
globally shared data space maintaining availability in face of network partitions and
the context space allowing reasoning on context data and context addressable. The
value of these services would be great in both of the given PoC examples (Section 3.2),
but the value is diminishing if the data gathered in the network cannot be trusted.
Our research increases the potential value of the services on the MIDAS middleware by
securing them. With the security we have suggested it would be possible to implement
commercial services for paying customers without these services being exploited by
others. This is an increased value that can be seen in relation to the ethical issues
presented in Chapter 4, as a security incident could be expensive for the domain
responsible, both in terms of lost revenue and negative media attention.
As MIDAS is a new idea with special properties we have done a lot of work
investigating how to best incorporate security features. This includes researching the
MIDAS specifics as well as what MIDAS has in common with other systems. The
lessons learned for MIDAS can also be used in next generation systems and systems
which needs to be fully distributed.
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8.7 Feasibility
The time constraints of this thesis did not allow for a PoC implementation. Future
work should be done on how the building blocks of Chapter 6 could be implemented
in MIDAS. Without any PoC implementation we can only suggest a solution, not
go into specific implementation details. However, we will discuss properties of our
solution that effect the possibility of an implementation below.
PGP cryptographic library PGP has been chosen as the cryptographic library to
generate public/private keys, signatures and encrypted messages. PGP is well
suited for the problem at hand because it uses the web-of-trust model that can
cross sign public keys and these signatures are stored in a public keyring which
can easily be stored in MDS. PGP is also based on well tested technology and the
implementation has been scrutinized by security experts from all over the world.
However, it might not necessarily integrate well with the Java platform used in
the current version of MIDAS. There exists some attempts at integrating PGP
with Java using the Java Native Interface (JNI) and GnuPG Made Easy (GPGME)
[18]. When using the native interface the Java code is no longer guarantied to be
platform independent and the PGP libraries have to be able to compile and run
on the mobile devices where MIDAS will be used.
The fact that the current implementation of MIDAS uses Java, does not mean
that this will be true if a commercial implementation is made. Further-more
it would be possible to implement a subset of PGP using Java because of the
wide range of cryptographic algorithms already available in core libraries. We
recommend using PGP as it is the technology best suited for the task, but it might
be possible to exchange PGP with other technologies with the same properties
if somehow PGP doesn’t work with Java. (public/private keys, web-of-trust,
message signatures and encryption).
Storage and bandwidth overhead Our solution imposes overhead both in transmit-
ted messages and in MDS. For MDS the overhead of the metadata amounts to
216 bytes (3x64 bytes varchar + 2x4 bytes integer + 2x8 bytes timestamp). By
generating a detached signature with PGP the signature takes an additional 65
bytes. The size of metadata will increase with 30%. We think this overhead is
acceptable because it is static and won’t increase with the size of the messages.
The same overhead is generated with signed application messages and will be
acceptable for all but very small messages. When messages are encrypted, PGP
first applies compression on the file to make its content look more random. An
encrypted message will in many cases use less bytes than the original, due to the
compression, and thus save bandwidth.
When signed context certificates and signed permission certificates are used
the overhead becomes much larger. The example signed context certificate in
Appendix C shows how these certificates can be implemented using XML. The
total size will vary, but in our example a human readable version takes 680 bytes.
If fine-grained access control is critical for the application this overhead will have
to be accepted.
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Performance impact In addition to the storage and bandwidth overhead, the pro-
posed security solution has negative performance impacts locally on the node.
Cryptographic operations are relatively Central Processor Unit (CPU) intensive
of nature and hand-held devices usually have limited processing power. Another
problem is the extra battery consumption by the CPU when it is working hard.
The most common cryptographic operation in our solution will be to check
signatures. This will have to be done when receiving messages, querying MDS
or checking public keys and needs to be fast. We ran a simple test on a 266
MHz Pentium II running in single-user mode (a single process only, no multiuser
environment). We signed a 1 kB file containing random data and tried verifying
this signatur 1000 times. This should show how much time is needed to simply
verify a signature. The result states that verification only took 52.671s averaging
about 19 verifications a second. Using 52.6ms to verify a signature is fast enough
for use in MIDAS.
Performance testing is complicated by the fact that the time spent on verification
is dependent on the message size. When sending messages we do believe that
the bandwidth (especially for bluetooth) will be the bottleneck for throughput,
but signature generation and verification will inevitably lead to higher latency.
This because the bandwith for bluetooth is about 1-3 Mbit/s2 depending on
the version, and as the testing above showed PGP can verify signatures with
a throughput larger than 1Mbyte/s. Without actual testing on the MIDAS
middleware it is difficult to determine if this latency will be large enough to
become a problem.
When encrypting messages we saw that the size decreased and it saved band-
width. However, the latency of messages will be even greater than for signed
messages because of the added work of performing compression and encryption.
If the data to be communicated is sensitive this overhead will have to be
accepted.
We suggested in Section 6.5.1 that it would be possible to sign network layer
packets, thereby discarding malicious packets early and be able to detect
malicious nodes. As MIDAS operates with UDP/IP packets a 65 byte large PGP
signature will be unacceptable at this level as the UDP/IP headers are 8 bytes
which makes the overhead eight times bigger than the UDP/IP headers. The
performance impact from verification at each hop will also seriously increase the
latency.
Technological development will help make these problems less of an issue.
Powerful hand held devices today typically have a 400MHz CPU.3 Because of
Moores law [45]4 and experience of the past, CPUs will be cheaper and use less
power at higher speeds. Battery technology will also increase the operational
lifetime of a device.
Architectural changes Our proposed solution follows a modular approach and can be
integrated in MIDAS without large architectural changes. Most of our security
2According to Bluetooth SIG http://www.bluetooth.com/Bluetooth/Technology/Basics.htm
3Based on an investigation of product specifications. E.g. the HTC TyTN II
http://www.htc.com/www/product.aspx?id=644
4It is viewed as a self-fulfilling prophecy which drives the progress of manufacturers
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mechanisms are optional and will therefore only extend the existing API instead
of modifying it. The baseline demands that PGP keys are provided or generated
on startup and public keys uploaded to the key server. This implies minor
changes to the existing logic and database schema. Messages with a signature
attached should also automatically be verified which means changing the way
messages are received. For database tables where signatures are required this
should also happen without developers having to specify it directly. This means
modifying the query parser so that it does this automatically. This might prove
the most difficult change to implement, but we strongly believe that its possible.
Overall we think that our solution is feasible and that MIDAS will be able to integrate
our proposed security solution smoothly.
8.8 Design consequences
In this section we discuss benefits, pitfalls and unresolved issues in our design. We
highlight why we have designed the solution the way we did and what problems the
design doesn’t solve. To conclude we present the issues we think is important for
MIDAS to examine in order to be confident that security is managed well.
8.8.1 Benefits of the proposed design
The benefits of our proposed solution is first and foremost integrity. With the web-
of-trust and personal keys, data can have an owner which is identifiable. This means
that our solution at least strengthens auditing which is important when investigating
an emergency situation after the incident. Integrity is made available in the baseline
configuration presented in Section 7.1.
The second benefit of our solution as we see it is close integration with the rest of
MIDAS. Our solution follows the same principals and are constructed in the same
manner. It will not be necessary to change the architecture, just incorporate the
suggested security mechanisms in already established modules and add some new
ones. The solution is modular and can be used stepwise, adding more modules if you
need them, as long as the baseline is present. This dynamic property is useful since
MIDAS is to be used in a wide range of applications and new demands can arise in
unforeseen domain areas.
If we compare the solution to other proposed MANET solutions, our solution makes
it easier to extend the network since the web-of-trust allows new nodes to be included
in the network at any time. It is also possible to take advantage of preparations made
beforehand, like for instance distribute certificates before network setup. This dynamic
network benefit is also in accordance with MIDAS stated goals, which aims for a fully
distributed network where people can join or leave whenever.
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8.8.2 Pitfalls
The suggested security solution has been composed with certain assumptions about
the middleware and is designed based on our understanding of the MIDAS docu-
mentation. The MIDAS documentation was not completed at the time of reading so
changes can occur. This is a possible pitfall if the solution is used without verification
from the middleware designers, programmers and security specialists.
It is still possible to harvest usage information by participating in the network,
downloading all data available. It is also impossible to be anonymous due to the public
keys which are distributed by the key server. More work needs to be done to identify
vulnerable information and apply the appropriate security measures to protect them.
The identification of vulnerable information will probably involve making a policy
stating how information should be treated and analysis of the different domain
models. Which security measures that is needed can then be researched.
Additionally it is necessary to acknowledge that our solution does not fulfill all the
requirements, and the requirements might change over time. We have given a solution
that we think will improve the overall security while preserving the usability.
8.8.3 Further issues that need to be resolved
When the solution is implemented into MIDAS some issues needs attention. In
addition to verification of the implemented security, as pointed out above, a review of
the new system with security included should be performed by a security analyst. The
review should look for the weakest link in the resulting system and do a risk analysis
using an updated threat model. This should of course be a part of the development
life-cycle to build security in, rather than adding it later. The importance of early
involvement and building security in is demonstrated well by Gary McGraw in his
book on the subject [30].
Another major issue that our solution we didn’t take care of in a satisfactory way is
the routing protocol and protection of the network layer. The suggestion of signing
packets at the network layer is viewed as too problematic due to the overhead it
creates. The routing protocol is also an issue as it distributes every address for every
node to all other nodes and is not secured. This makes the routing protocol the next
priority, if our solution is implemented and security requirements are high. Routing
and communications technology is not our area of expertise which is why we have not
emphasised it in this thesis.
8.9 Coverage of functional security requirements
Not all security requirements from Chapter 5 are fulfilled by our proposed solution.
The functional security requirements (Requirement SR 1 through SR 26) are discussed
in this section, and the ethical issues (Requirement SR 27 through SR 35) are discussed
separately in Section 8.10.
Some of the requirements are difficult to solve with security mechanisms, because they
involve usability and user interface specifics. Examples of this are requirements SR 6
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through SR 9 examples of this, and they have not been addressed.
Table 8.1 shows which configurations solve which requirements. Notice how baseline
is a prerequisite for the other configurations, so a requirement solved by baseline is
automatically solved in the others. We see that requirements SR 2 and SR 10 can be
implemented by developers on an application level with the baseline configuration in
place, but this does not mean that baseline solves them, which is why they are not
checked in the table.
There are three functional security requirements that our solution can’t solve (Require-
ments SR 6 through SR 9 are not viewed as functional requirements). Requirement
SR 17 is a requirement which stems from a concern in the MIDAS documentation. It
is however, the equivalent of having a back door in the security and these types of
requirements can be dangerous to implement.
The other requirements are nicely spread out on the different configurations which
were expected as they cover different types of security considerations. If we include
the library functions we have solved 19 out of 22 functional requirements, three
functional requirements are not solved and four requirements are not possible to solve
with security building blocks.
8.10 Ethical security requirements
In Chapter 4 we presented ethical issues. From those issues came requirements which
were taken into account when the security solution was created. In this section we will
discuss how ethical issues, through the requirements, have been taken care of. We will
also discuss why some ethical issues have been difficult to address.
8.10.1 Coverage of ethical issues
The requirements that have been covered well are the following:
SR 29 This requirement is covered if signing of database operations as presented in
Section 7.3 is used. As described this will protect the integrity of information
contained in MDS at row level.
SR 34 We have not specifically written anything about this requirement, but this can
be achieved by an user policy agreement on startup of the middleware. For
instance when new applications are deployed, the middleware can warn the user
of dangers when contributing potentially sensitive information and show terms
of agreement which must be accepted.
We see that the percentage of requirements that are covered is low, which as stated
earlier is due to the wording, or the difficult MANET environment. The requirements
that are covered are the ones that are concerned with integrity and information
awareness. Integrity is the security primitive we have put in most effort to achieve.
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SR 1 X X X X
SR 2
SR 3 X X X X
SR 4 X X X X
SR 5
SR 6
SR 7
SR 8
SR 9
SR 10 X
SR 11 X X
SR 12 X X
SR 13 X
SR 14 X
SR 15 X X
SR 16 X
SR 17
SR 18 X X X X X
SR 19 X
SR 20 X
SR 21 X
SR 22 X X X X X
SR 23 X X X X X
SR 24 X X X X X
SR 25 X
SR 26 X
Table 8.1: Which configuration solves which security requirement
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8.10.2 Ethical issues not taken care of
SR 27 Sensitive information can be protected, but the middleware is not responsible
for protecting it. Application developers can use the library functions for
encryption of database rows on data they think is sensitive. It is not possible
for a user to protect specific data beyond that.
SR 28 This requirement is partially connected to the previous requirement. An access
control scheme exists and is put in the configuration described in Section 7.4, but
the protection of sensitive data still depends upon the application developers
and incorporation of row level encryption.
SR 30 This requirement states that context information can be sensitive and a pro-
tection mechanism should therefore be available. This requirement is not met
by any of the suggested security solutions, mainly because it would render
CAM useless if we encrypted the data and the aggregated context information is
distributed with the routing protocol packages.
SR 31 We have not given a routing protocol solution which anonymises users and the
message encryption described in 7.5 is not default enabled. In order to fulfill the
requirement the routing protocol must be protected and application developers
must use secure messaging.
SR 35 There aren’t many default settings to speak of, but those who are available are
not a part of the baseline configuration, which makes it difficult to argue that this
requirement is fulfilled. This requirement is not only about the middleware, but
also a note to all application developers.
8.11 Suggested configurations for MIDAS PoC scenarios
The scenarios described in Section 3.2 were chosen by the MIDAS project team
because of their different requirements. We therefore use them as examples for which
configurations we think are appropriate to use in each scenario. Likely attackers from
Section 4.4 are also mentioned.
As long as the Sports scenario only use applications for information sharing amongst
the spectators and from the domain responsible it will suffice to use the proposed
Baseline configuration. With it comes the possibility of auditing. If other applications,
written for the contestants, need to protect sensitive data it will not have the large
user mass that the other applications for spectators have, so application level security
should be used. This is mainly because a more secure configuration would impose
possible performance issues for the spectator applications. The typical attacker in the
Sports scenario is the script kiddie, since there is little economic gain of attacking the
applications, nor sensitive information in the system. This means that determined
attackers have little to gain from attacking applications in the Sports scenario.
The Emergency scenario will contain sensitive information and can be brought about
from a deliberate evil act, meaning someone has the incentive to do harm. Possible
attackers here are external determined attackers who will attack the system to disrupt
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or corrupt information. It is also possible to envision applications where victims try
to manipulate sensor information to get rescued first. Both types of attackers will try
to alter data and try to get information they aren’t supposed to get. We suggest that
this scenario uses the full extent of our configurations and use library functions as well
to harden the applications further. Even with our suggested security the applications
in this scenario will be vulnerable, due to the unresolved issues presented in Section
8.8.3.
8.12 Division of responsibility between application and
middleware
We have designed the MIDAS middleware security so that it supports a library of
security functionality, it does not dictate what mechanisms applications should use.
This is because different service domains have varying security needs. It’s up to
application developers to utilise the needed security functionality. Some security
mechanisms should be taken care of by the middleware because they are useful
for a lot of application scenarios. Others are less frequently needed and could be
implemented at the application level instead of in the middleware.
The argument for keeping some functionality out of the middleware is the principle of
keeping it simple. A middleware API should be easy to use and understand, and this
is more important for security functionality since wrong assumptions about what the
functionality really does might lead to insecure applications.
Message received verification is an example of a security mechanism that might not
be needed in most application domains. It is also a lot of things to consider, like
how to manage lost messages, timeouts and refusing to answer, making it difficult
to implement and unnecessary for general purpose applications. We think that
this service is best to implement in applications that need it on top of the MIDAS
middleware. Our simple form of verification (described in Section 6.5.5) sends out a
message with a onetime nonce and expects the receiver to reply with a signed version
of this nonce when the messages is read. Since MIDAS does not guarantee delivery the
sender must have a timeout after which it will assume the message was lost. Whether
or not to resend must be up to the application developer or the user.
Other mechanisms should be enforced by the middleware. An example would be the
row level signatures. When performing operations on a table which is defined in MDS
to require a signature, verification and signature generation should be performed by
the middleware without involvement from application developers. Primitives that
protect the routing protocol should also be enforced by the middleware.
If our solution is implemented in MIDAS a thorough evaluation should be performed,
which examines and chooses which mechanisms to support and which to drop.
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8.13 Choice of technology
In Section 6.1 we proposed to use PGP to enable the web-of-trust model. The obvious
alternative was to use X.509 which is more common in commercial PKI systems. There
are several advantages with using PGP. The normal operation of PGP is the web-
of-trust model which is necessary for the decentralized model in MIDAS. PGP also
has a public keyring in a defined format which holds the trust relations of a single
user, and can be distributed freely. This makes implementing a central key server in
MDS straightforward. Another attractive feature is that PGP provides efficient end-to-
end message encryption for multiple recipients, by generating a onetime symmetric
session key and only encrypting the session key using public key cryptography. This
is faster than encrypting the entire message multiple times using only public key
cryptography (more data to encrypt and public key cryptography is significantly
slower than symmetric keys).
X.509 certificates could still be used if this is more desirable due to other implemen-
tation constraints. An custom extension to X.509 makes it possible to realize the web-
of-trust model with a so called cross-certified mesh described by Linn [27] [15]. Here
participants in a network can sign each others X.509 keys to generate trust relations. A
key server capable of distributing public certificates and trust relations will then have
to be implemented in the middleware. A scheme for encrypting messages for multiple
recipients will also have to be made. The upside is that X.509 certificates are supported
directly by Java and has widespread use in commercial PKI systems.
A third option is to implement the needed cryptographic libraries manually. Neither
PGP nor X.509 is required for our solution to work. As long as the web-of-trust
model is covered and nodes can be uniquely identified, our solution will be possible
to implement. This solution should only be considered if using PGP or X.509
proves to have to much performance impact on the overall system. Writing custom
cryptographic systems (and especially if low key lengths have to be used to keep
performance up) are difficult at best and need to be done by professionals.
8.14 Web-of-trust model
One inherent problem of the web-of-trust model is that different nodes will evaluate
access permissions differently based on their individual trust networks (which contra-
dicts Requirement SR 15). This problem does not exist using X.509 certificates without
extensions because of the strict hierarchical structure.
The problem occurs when one node set access restrictions on some data (e.g. access for
Police officer) and leaves it to another node to enforce these restrictions (e.g. a storage
node). The storage node can only verify permissions based on its own public keyring
and trust network.
The novel approach to solve this would be to let the original node handle all access
requests. This will create a choke point and limit availability in partitioned networks.
If a trusted node (or set of nodes) are present in the network, then the responsibility
can be given to these. This however conflicts with the requirement of decentralized
control. More work should be done looking at existing research and new ways to
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solve this.
Another problem with the web-of-trust model arise when the number of signed
keys are sparse. Finding certificate chains to verify nodes in this network become
impossible. This would easily be the case in the sports scenario where most of the
spectators will have little or no trust in the network. In the sports scenario this is of
little relevance since spectators mostly need access to public information which isn’t
protected. In other scenarios this might become an issue.
One solution to this problem is to make key signing as easy as possible while still
maintaining security, so that the trust network can be expanded quickly. Nodes in
reach of each other (in the same local area network) could automatically exchange
keys so that signing becomes only a matter of verifying fingerprint and identity.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future work
9.1 Conclusion
According to the problem statement given in the introduction to this thesis the
objectives was to: Identify security needs in the MIDAS middleware, and evaluate
possible solutions.
We identified the security needs by studying the MIDAS documentation and papers
written about security in other similar systems. The case study approach gave us a
deeper understanding of MIDAS and enabled us to use prior knowledge to identify the
possible weaknesses and threats against MIDAS. The weaknesses and threats along
with ethical issues resulted in a list of requirements that answers the first part of the
problem statement.
The possible solutions we have given consist of security building blocks that can be
combined in different configurations which represents different levels of security. The
solutions were then discussed to point out what problems they address. The number
of covered requirements were: 19 of 22 functional requirements and 2 of 7 ethical
requirements.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 presents security building blocks, different configurations and
the discussion answers the second part of the problem statement. The evaluation of
possible solutions end with a feasibility discussion where we state that the storage
overhead is acceptable, but cryptographic operations will increase the network latency
which will need closer investigation and is a trade-off situation between usability and
security.
We found that our proposed solution requires only minor architectural changes, and
must be integrated into existing components. It is possible that an architectural change
will be necessary to protect the routing protocol, but we cannot yet conclude anything
in this direction.
The division of responsibility, what is done by whom, between the MIDAS middle-
ware and applications is not entirely clear. Our suggestion is to make the digital
signing a middleware responsibility, where a developer can specify that some data
needs integrity and the middleware automatically signs and verifies data. Other
security parts are available as library functions for the application developers, but
they are not mandatory. This is equivalent to a shared responsibility between the
67
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
middleware and the applications as the functionality is available, but when and how
to use it is up to the application developers.
9.2 Future work
When MIDAS goes past the research stage and is ready for commercial use it will have
to make sure security is managed, and clear guidelines for what is acceptable and what
isn’t have to be worked out by domain responsibles. Future work in the perspective of
MIDAS and security analysis requires at least that security expertise is included into
the design and development team to make sure it is done right.
When application developers develop applications it would be advisable to do a risk
analysis for the task and domain at hand, which cannot be done in general terms, for
all domains at once. The results of a risk analysis can then be used to select the proper
security mechanisms to mitigate the risks. Our thesis can help both to identify typical
threats and to select security mechanisms.
Future work that should be performed researching security in MIDAS include:
Routing protocol The routing protocol should be researched further to perhaps find a
way to secure it, or if this proves to be impossible, it should be redesigned. This
is a big task that should be done by a network and security specialist.
Detection of misbehaving nodes We described in Chapter 6 a way of detecting
misbehaving nodes. Whether or not this detection method is effective or not
needs more research by simulation and testing. This research should reveal if the
method catches misbehaving nodes and if there is a problem with false positives.
Selection of algorithms Our thesis gives the security design and shows how it is
possible to integrate security, but remains algorithm neutral. We have shown
that solutions exist which can implement the building blocks, but when the
implementation starts specific algorithms must be selected, and a choice between
developing software or using existing off the shelf components must be made
based on a deeper investigation of the market.
Ontology based trust Ontology based trust enables trust to be limited to specific
terms defined in the ontology. By using ontology based trust you can trust
someone for a given period of time, in those areas where he is trustworthy,
instead of trusting him unconditionally. This form of trust management should
be researched as it can add degrees of trust and propagation of trust in the
network [21].This form of trust adds a new level of trust relationships on top
of the web-of-trust we have presented in this thesis.
Different viewpoints in the web-of-trust Section 8.14 discussed the viewpoints of
different nodes and how they would evaluate access permissions. How to solve
the viewpoint problem without creating choke points and being dependent upon
central nodes needs more work.
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Proof of concept implementation A proof of concept implementation of the baseline
configuration should be done. The implementation will prove if it is feasible to
integrate security into the MIDAS middleware the way we have suggested.
Performance evaluation A performance evaluation of encryption and signing al-
gorithms should be done. The performance evaluation can be done at two
levels; separate from MIDAS by testing the algorithms on selected devices, and
integrated in the proof of concept. The first type is easier and will give a hint as
to whether it is an acceptable overhead or not, but the second type will yield a
real life situation where unexpected side-effects can be identified as well.
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AC Access Control
API Application Programming Interface
CA Certificate authority
CAM Context addressable messages
CBR Context based routing
CFG Common Functions
CKB Context knowledge base
CPU Central Processor Unit
CRT Communication and routing
CTX Context engine
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DAC Discretionary access control
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DoS Denial of Service
DPL Deployment
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RF Radio Frequency
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TTL time to live
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A. SECURITY CHALLENGES FROM THE MIDAS DOCUMENTATION
A Security challenges from the MIDAS documentation
C1 Information may be sensitive and not intended for
all users of the network. Mechanisms are needed to
protect sensitive information when stored and when
communicated, and there must be limitations as to who
gets access to what information.
C2 Since emergency and rescue operations may take
place anywhere one should not rely on central units
outside the emergency area to provide for instance
authentication of users.
C3 It is difficult to know beforehand who will need access
to what information. It is not possible to know where
the emergency will take place and who will be involved.
C4 Roles may also be changed along the way, e.g. as more
rescuers come to the scene.
C5 Especially if the emergency was intentional (e.g.
terrorist attack) it is important to limit possibilities for
malicious users and outsiders to disrupt services or
spread incorrect information and messages.
C6 Assuring privacy will in many cases be less impor-
tant than to perform effective emergency and rescue
operations. This means that in some cases it may
be necessary to have the possibility to bypass access
control restrictions, something that will result in weaker
overall protection of information.
C7 Mechanisms that assure non-repudiation of orders
given may be needed.
C8 Receive receipts that information has been
received/read may be needed.
C9 The security solutions offered by MIDAS must be easy
to set up, to allow for rapid setup and configuration.
C10 The number of users and the limited possibilities to es-
tablish access credentials beforehand poses challenges
for authentication and access control.
C11 The authentication solutions must be simple, meaning
that they are fast and easy to use, while assuring that
users can get access to services in a controlled manner.
C12 Some services offered may use context information on
the users (e.g. location of users to get information on
when their favourite biker are passing). Users may
want to protect this information to ensure privacy.
C13 Users may want assurance that information they send
or information on which services they use are not
available to other users, to ensure privacy.
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C14 If users pay for services, it is important to assure that
users cannot simply share their access with e.g. family
and friends.
C15 If users pay for services, information security will
be a major concern when implementing payment
mechanisms.
C16 Ad-hoc networks also come with additional challenges
since attackers can become a router, and thereby attack
the routing itself by announcing false routing packets.
C17 It is also possible to attack the data pane by dropping,
replaying or injecting packets.
C18 For routing of sensitive information [. . . ] there is
also a need to make sure that e.g. attackers or
malicious users cannot get access to large amounts of
information by placing themselves in central positions
in the network. Trust between nodes becomes a main
issue, and authentication of nodes, not only users,
becomes important.
C19 When designing and implementing security solutions,
it must be taken into account that terminals can be
stolen or lost.
C20 With such devices [laptops, mobile phones and PDAs]
users have physical control of the component, meaning
that it should be measures in place to assure that users
cannot e.g. change their access rights by changing files
or similar in their terminal.
C21 By performing general attacks on nodes that are part
of the MIDAS network attackers may e.g. get access to
information and services.
C22 Access control to information must not only be present
at e.g. Super Nodes, but must take place all places
information and services are available.
Table A-1: Security challenges from the MIDAS
documentation
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B Security requirements
Demand Comment
SR 1(M) Users must be able to report lost
or stolen devices at which point
they would be considered
untrusted by the network.
Reports should be impossible to
deny or withdraw. Special care
to prevent denial of services has
to be taken.
SR 2(M) Data stored on nodes should
not be easily available if device
is stolen or lost.
C19
SR 3(M) Users should not be able to
elevate their permissions by
changing files locally on device.
This includes modifying the
middleware software itself.
C20
SR 4(M) The devices should verify the
identity of the user (user
authentication) so that stolen
devices are rendered useless.
C20
SR 5(M) General remote attacks on
nodes should not reveal
sensitive information to an
attacker.
C21
SR 6(H) Security solutions in MIDAS
should be easy to set up, both to
allow rapid network
deployment and eliminate the
need for technical personnel.
C9
SR 7(H) Authentication mechanisms
must be simple to use for
non-technical users.
C11
SR 8(M) Tools for managing permissions
must be intuitive and self
explanatory
.
SR 9(M) Most security settings should be
managed with little or no user
involvement.
SR 10(H) Sensitive information must be
protected when stored and
communicated.
C1
SR 11(H) There must be limitations as to
who gets access to what
information.
C1
81
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Demand Comment
SR 12(H) Access granting should be
possible both off-line and
on-site.
C3
SR 13(M) The middleware must support
well defined roles.
C4
SR 14(L) Access should be granted to a
given role or user. Roles might
change dynamically as users
leave or arrive.
C4
SR 15(M) Every node should be able to
evaluate access permissions and
the result the of evaluation must
be the same on all nodes. This
includes authentication, role
and permission verification.
C2, C22. Evaluation
changes dependent on
who you trust, so this
might be difficult to
achieve in practice.
SR 16(M) Users (or applications)
providing information into the
network should be able to set
access restrictions on the data
they provide.
SR 17(M) Access restrictions should in
some cases be possible to
bypass.
C6 This applies in the
emergency rescue
scenario when lives are at
risk.
SR 18(H) Nodes must be able to
participate in the network
without access credentials
having to be established
beforehand.
C10
SR 19(H) Untrusted nodes should be able
to handle (store, route) sensitive
information.
That is to say they need
to be able to receive
messages they do not
have access to read.
SR 20(M) MIDAS should protect packets
from being modified in transit.
Malicious nodes should not be
able to disrupt service, gather
information, send false
messages or corrupt the routing
protocol (includes dropping,
replaying or injecting packets).
C5, C16, C17
SR 21(L) Malicious nodes trying to
disrupt the service should be
detected and locked out. This
has to be done in a way so that
obvious denial-of-service
attacks are not possible.
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Demand Comment
SR 22(L) Malicious nodes should not be
able to gather sensitive
information when routing
messages.
C18
SR 23(H) MIDAS must be able to
unambiguously determine the
source of a message.
node and maybe also
user.
SR 24(M) The trust model between peers
in the MIDAS network must
support ad-hoc setup and
match any hierarchical
structure.
Pure tree-like structures
with a single root node
might be to restrictive
SR 25(L) Some messages should force
returning a receipt upon
receiving/reading.
C8
SR 26(M) MIDAS needs to support secure
communication between nodes
trusting each other without
having to trust every routing
node in between. This includes
message integrity, data
protection, non-repudiation and
protection against replay
attacks.
C7
SR 27(H) Sensitive information (as seen
from the system) must be
secured to prevent unwanted
exposure.
SR 28(H) The middleware must protect
sensitive information from
unauthorized access.
SR 29(H) The middleware must protect
the integrity of information.
SR 30(M) Some context information is
considered sensitive and should
therefore be protected. This
includes aggregated data.
C12
SR 31(M) Usage of services and peer
interaction is sensitive
information and must therefore
be protected.
C13, This requirement is
based on privacy issues
when for instance a
contestant in the sports
scenario requests medical
attention. This should
not be broadcast to
opponents team leaders.
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Demand Comment
SR 32(H) Personal information should be
deleted at the request of data
owner.
SR 33(M) Users have to be able to see
what information they share to
others.
SR 34(H) Users should be warned about
what the information they give
will be used for.
SR 35(M) Default settings must favour a
high degree of privacy.
Table B-2: Security requirements specification
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C. EXAMPLE ON SIGNED CONTEXT CERTIFICATE
C Example on signed context certificate
Example of what an xml-based context certificate might look like. The certificate have
been signed with PGP using cleartext-sign. This yields a human readable output, but
uses more space. A binary format signature is also possible. Sizes of both types of files
are given below.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
<context-certificate>
<unique-identifier type="pgp-fingerprint">
AD82 54B3 39CE 673A 1406 FD07 5CA4 50DE 52B7 487E
</unique-identifier>
<context>
Police officer
</context>
<valid-to dateformat="utc">
Thu Jun 29 09:59:04 UTC 2008
</valid-to>
<signing-authority type="pgp-fingerprint">
73DA 818A B0DF BCB2 187B 80B6 76CC F0C1 76BD 4309
</signing-authority>
</context-certificate>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux)
iD4DBQFIPn9edszwwXa9QwkRAhV2AJ93MLkPwEw26RR2yTbpxybv98CI6wCYuc3H
Q0Skd/hYBPWltkxds7t37w==
=pUjH
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Total size of xml input: 444 bytes
Total size of signed input: 680 bytes
Total size of signed certificate using binary format: 377 bytes
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